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BABY DOE AND BEYOND: EXAMINING THE
PRACTICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES
IMPACTING MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING ON
BEHALF OF MARGINALLY-VIABLE NEWBORNS
Craig A. Conway*
ABSTRACT
Infants born at twenty-seven weeks of gestation or less, or
weighing less than 1000 grams, are considered to be extremely
premature. These newborns teeter on the cusp of viability; it is only
with aggressive medical intervention applied to virtually every bodily
system that they have any chance of survival. If these marginally-
viable newborns do, in fact, survive, they likely will experience a
lifetime of severe physical, mental, and emotional handicaps-often
as a direct result of the medical treatment they received.
Consequently, this population represents one of the most contested
treatment groups in medicine.
Advances in technology and medical education in the past century
have allowed doctors to save some of these extremely premature
newborns who previously would have most certainly died. However,
the philosophical, ethical, and legal concerns raised by attempting to
preserve these infants are being weighed by an increasing number of
decision makers. Whereas, prior to the 1970s, decisions regarding the
infant's treatment plan were primarily in the hands of the parents and
physicians-that is no longer the case. What was once a private
decision made by these grief-stricken parents with the advice of their
physicians has since become a matter for the public domain. These
fragile infant's outcomes are now being debated by parents,
* Research Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute, LL.M.
(Health Law), University of Houston Law Center, J.D. Syracuse University College of Law. The author
would like to thank William Winslade, Leslie Griffin, Nathan Andersen, and Anne Kimbol for their
advice, guidance, and support during the writing of this article. Most importantly, the author wishes to
thank his wife, Sarai, and their son, Harrison, for their love and support while he was pursuing his
LL.M. and throughout the writing of this article.
1097
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1097 2008-2009
   : I   
  pmL pmC  
  - KI G  
 - IABLE  
i  
 
t      
   
r t r .  r  t t   t     
it     
t  t t t      . 
i l  r  , i  t, ,   
lif ti   r  i l, t l,   icaps- Qfte  
    t  
tl , t i  l ti  t    t  
 . 
 i  t l   i l ti    
 ll  t r  t     t  t l   
r s  r i sl  l   t t i l  i . , 
t e il s ical, t i l,  l l r  r i   tt ti  t  
 t     i  r f 
i i  . ,   
i t'  t  ril   t   
i i -that i   l r t  . t    
i i        
i i   i   i   
fr il  i f t'  t      , 
• Research Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute, LL.M. 
( ealth a ), niversity f st   t r, . . r  i rsity llege  .   
would like to thank illia  inslade, Leslie riffin, athan ndersen, a  nne i bol f r t eir 
a ice, i ,  rt ri  t  riti   t is ti l .  t tl ,  t r i es  
thank his ife, Sarai, and their son, arrison, for their love and support hile he as rs ing is 
. .  t r t t  riti  f t i  ti l . 
 
1
Conway: Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical In
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
physicians, hospital administrators and bioethics committees,
legislators, courts, media outlets, and the general public. The current
situation is less problematic when the decision-making agents are in
agreement regarding the infant's course of treatment. However, when
disagreements arise, a once private heartbreak can now become a
public controversy that lacks a single, agreed-upon agent for making
the life and death care choices in the best interests of the newborn.
Instead, a seemingly moral, ethical, and legal tug-of-war between the
parties can erupt, each differently valuing the medical condition and
care of the barely viable neonate whose potential quality of life is
unknown.
After introducing the multiple actors and variables that lead to the
emergence of conflict in medical decision making on behalf of a
marginally viable infant, this Article details the practical criteria
physicians use when determining whether aggressive medical
treatment should be initiated or when palliative care should be
provided to an extremely premature infant. The Article then discusses
the sometimes difficult process of determining a medical treatment
plan made in the "best interests" of the infant. The Article then
explores the value system of vitalism often possessed by parents or
others adamantly expressing that their child's life should be
preserved at all costs, and often in spite of the pain and suffering
endured by the newborn; such a belief system often leads to conflict
in medical decision making and may ultimately lead to litigation.
Though they are not cases of extreme prematurity, the medical and
legal cases of Sun Hudson and Emilio Gonzales are representative of
such resulting litigation. The Article then examines the chronological
history, evolution of, and subsequent impact of the Baby Doe
regulations initiated by the Reagan Administration. Next, the Article
examines the medical and legal case of Sidney Miller which best
represents conflict resulting from the convergence of the multiple
variables discussed. The Article then examines the most recent
legislative initiative to inject a philosophical preference for the
sanctity of life into medical decision making via the Born-Alive
Infants Protection Act of 2002. The Article then provides
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recommendations to reduce or remove parent-physician conflict and
concludes with an argument for consistent assessment of the infant,
care and counseling to be provided to families, and collaborative
decision making to determine a medical course of action that is in the
best interests of the infant.
INTRODUCTION
Set off in a small meeting room just outside the neonatal intensive
care unit (NICU) at a nearby hospital, the parents of an infant born at
the edge of viability meet with the attending neonatologist to discuss
their newbom's grim prognosis. Sitting on the blue vinyl couch
tucked in the comer of the sterile beige room, the parents look to the
physician for answers in a seemingly hopeless situation. For a
moment, the whirring of the overhead ceiling fan is the only sound
heard. This was not where the parents envisioned themselves
eventually sitting when they first learned they were going to have a
child. Then the neonatologist begins to lay out the cold, hard facts
about their child's medical condition. Born at twenty-four weeks of
gestation, the newborn is sixteen weeks premature of the forty weeks
required of a full-term pregnancy. Weighing just over two pounds,
the infant could fit into the palm of an adult hand. Every organ and
system in the fragile infant's body is underdeveloped and struggling
to function. The child is unable to breathe without assistance from a
respirator and recently developed an infection that appears to be
getting worse. There are small, thin lines of varying colors inserted at
various locations on the infant's body, delivering antibiotics, steroids,
nutrition, and other medicines to ensure the infant's survival. Beeping
and buzzing machines loom nearby to inform medical staff of the
infant's heart rate, breathing rate, and blood pressure. Looking at the
newborn in its current state is not easy. Its skin is nearly translucent
and wrinkled and purple veins are easily visible running throughout
its body. It appears to be struggling, but it is difficult to be sure.
Prolonging its life through medical means may eventually only cause
it pain and suffering. The physician informs the parents that even if
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their child survives, a lifetime of disabilities likely awaits including
blindness, seizures, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation. There are
no guarantees the neonatologist can provide. Then the physician asks
the question: "What would you like us to do? Do you want us to
continue doing everything we can to save your child? Or do you want
us to provide comfort care so that the child may peacefully die?"
This Article addresses medical decision-making made on behalf of
the most vulnerable of infants, those born alive but who without
receiving aggressive medical intervention would most certainly die.
They are typically born at twenty-seven weeks of gestation or less
and teeter on the cusp of viability. They are the borderline cases
physicians confront frequently; unable to sustain life on their own,
these newborns' futures are often in the hands of neonatologists and
other pediatric specialists. Given the technological advances and
medical knowledge at their disposal, neonatologists often must
decide not if they can, but if they should intervene to force life upon
an infant. Parents, lacking the medical expertise of the physician,
make extremely difficult decisions that pursue life or permit death for
their child. To choose life with resulting severe handicap takes a
profoundly deep emotional, psychological, and financial toll on the
parents and family. To choose death brings similar grief and
sometimes private regret that the parents should have chosen
differently. For nearly fifty years, NICUs have been the locus for this
debate.
Prior to the 1970s, decisions regarding the child's treatment plan
were primarily in the hands of the parents with physician
consultation; that is no longer the case. Parental autonomy in making
medical decisions on behalf of a child has been constrained in the
past thirty years. Today, the philosophical and practical concerns
raised by attempting to preserve these infants are being weighed by
an increasing number of decision makers including multiple
physicians, hospital administrators and bioethics committees,
legislators, courts, media outlets, and the general public. What was
once a private decision made by these grief-stricken parents, has
since become a matter for the public domain. The current situation is
1100 [Vol. 25:4
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relatively unproblematic when the decision-making actors are in
agreement regarding the infant's course of treatment. However, when
disagreements arise, a once private heartbreak can now become a
public debate that lacks a single, agreed-upon agent for making the
life and death care choices in the best interests of the newborn.
This Article begins by briefly exploring the historical restriction on
parental autonomy in making private medical treatment decisions on
behalf of an imperiled newborn due, in part, to an increasing number
of outside public influences. Then, after examining the practical,
medical criteria physicians use when determining whether aggressive
medical treatment or only palliative care should be provided to an
extremely premature infant, the Article explores the Best Interests
Standard, commonly used by physicians to guide medical treatment
decisions on behalf of extremely premature infants. Next, the Article
examines the philosophical value system of vitalism often held by
parents and others, which holds that a child's life is to be preserved at
all costs and often regardless of the pain and suffering endured by the
infant. Vitalist beliefs of the parents often conflict with practical
medical treatment decisions and ultimately may lead to litigation in
an attempt to resolve the disputes. The Article examines the legal
cases of Sun Hudson and Emilio Gonzales as representative of such
litigation. The Article then provides a chronological history of the
largely philosophical attempt by the Reagan Administration to
legislatively remove parental autonomy in making medical treatment
decisions on behalf of disabled infants through the enactment of the
federal Baby Doe rules and their resulting impact on modem
normative neonatal practice. As a premier example of the foregoing
actors and variables in conflict, the Article next examines the medical
and legal case of Sidney Miller-born extremely premature, and
subsequently severely disabled, her parents' decisions to forgo
resuscitation at birth were ignored by a health-care facility. The
Article then provides recommendations for formulating medical
treatment guidelines to reduce or remove parent-physician conflict
and concludes with an argument for consistent assessment and
reassessment of the infant, care and counseling to be provided to
20091
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parents and families, and collaborative decision making between
physicians and parents to determine a medical course of action in the
best interests of the infant.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EROSION OF PARENTAL AUTONOMY AND
THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC INFLUENCE IN MEDICAL DECISION
MAKING FOR MARGINALLY-VIABLE NEWBORNS
United States legal tradition accords parents with presumptive
authority to make decisions on behalf of a child based on the
assumption that the parents will act in the child's best interests.' This
authority extended to a parental right to direct the health-care
decisions made on behalf of a child.2 However, when forced to make
difficult choices that mean the life or death of a child, parents often
tend to be troubled by the awesomeness of the decision. Their anxiety
does not stem solely from a desire to make the "right" decision; it is
also generated by the input and opinions of treating physicians in
whom parents place a great deal of trust to provide accurate medical
information and to make realistic prognostic recommendations.
Physicians, in turn, are often influenced by competing interests in the
NICU, namely applying appropriate medical standards of care,
considering input from and opinions of other physicians and medical
staff, complying with hospital administration policies, following
recommendations of bioethics committees, and adhering to state and
federal law. Although a physician's priority is to his or her patient,
1. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (establishing a constitutional right
of parental autonomy to direct the education of their children as rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924) (relying on Meyer to further ground and
guarantee parental rights); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that "the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder").
2. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make
Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000); see
also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("[N]atural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children."); Shellie K. Park, Severing the Bond of Life: When Conflicts of Interest
Fail to Recognize the Value of Two Lives, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 157, 167-68 (2002).
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the rank order of other interests and their possible influence on
appropriate standards of care may affect physicians differently.
To complicate matters firther, parental autonomy to make medical
treatment determinations on behalf of a child, in concert with
physician consultation, has been limited in the past thirty years by
federal legislative initiatives based on the philosophical ideals of
protecting all life-regardless of its quality.3 Accordingly, these
federal laws have had the effect of not only limiting or denying
parents the freedom to decide what is morally and medically proper
in the best interests of a child, but has increasingly thrust these once-
private matters into the public domain for discussion. When
challenged, the courts have frequently (but not consistently) struck
down the laws and sided with parents as the proper decision makers
of their own child's future.4
What has developed is a seeming moral, ethical, and legal tug-of-
war between parent and physician and between legislative and
judicial actors, each actor differently weighing practical and
philosophical influences in how to make difficult decisions on behalf
of an extremely premature infant whose future quality of life is yet
unknown. The result is confusion and a lack of consensus as to who
has the final say in making medical decisions on behalf of an
imperiled infant.
This section of the Article provides a brief historical account of the
erosion of parental authority to make medical treatment decisions for
a marginally-viable or disabled infant leading to federal legislative
oversight attempting to philosophically preserve the sanctity of each
individual infant's life.
3. See discussion infra Parts V, VII.
4. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602; Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610 (1986); In re Infant
Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Ind. Apr. 12, 1982) (deferring to parental decision to
withhold treatment for a disabled newborn), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
20091 1103
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A. The Erosion of Parental Autonomy
Before 1970, questioning a parent's decision to withhold life-
sustaining treatment from an extremely premature infant was rarely
done by physicians. 5 At the same time, noted physicians published
articles in major medical journals about the practice of withholding
life-saving medical treatment from certain disabled infants. 6
In the social turmoil surrounding the early 1970s, including the
Vietnam War, the abortion debate, and the resignation of a president,
conservative fundamentalists and evangelicals, among others, became
increasingly disturbed by liberalizing trends in the United States. 7 In
their opinion, "the legalization of abortion, the sexual revolution, and
the gay rights movement," threatened traditional roles and was
believed to be an indication that society was breaking down.8 These
groups pushed back against those advocating for a woman's right to
choose and touted homosexuality as a sin.9 In the midst of the
abortion debate, a debate surrounding the value of life, the sanctity of
life, and quality of life shifted to the newborn delivery room.
In 1973, neonatologists Raymond S. Duff and A.G.M. Campbell
published a then-controversial article in the New England Journal of
Medicine about withholding treatment to marginally-viable and
defective newborns. 10 Writing about their experiences, Duff and
Campbell reported that fourteen percent (43 out of 299) of the deaths
in the special care nursery of the Yale-New Haven Hospital from
January 1, 1970 through June 30, 1972 were "associated with
discontinuance or withdrawal of treatment."" All of the infants had
some form of severe impairment that, in the judgment of the parents
5. See John A. Robertson, Extreme Prematurity and Parental Rights After Baby Doe, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jul.IAug. 2004, at 32.
6. Id.
7. See Robert D. Woodberry & Christian S. Smith, Fundamentalism et al: Conservative Protestants
in America, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 25, 44 (1998).
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care
Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (Oct. 25, 1973).
11. Id.
1104 [Vol. 25:4
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and physicians, made their prognosis for a meaningful life extremely
poor or hopeless. 12 It was argued by the authors that parents must
accept and be granted the responsibility to make treatment decisions
on behalf of an infant. They wrote:
We believe the burden of decision-making must be borne by
families and their professional advisors because they are most
familiar with the respective situations. Since families primarily
live with and are most affected by the decisions, it therefore
appears that society and the health professions should provide
only general guidelines for decision making. Moreover, since
variations between situations are so great, and the situations
themselves so complex, it follows that much latitude in decision
making should be expected and tolerated.
13
This viewpoint expressed by Duff and Campbell may, in fact, be the
dominant approach utilized in modem neonatology. 14 However, other
practical factors and philosophical influences have since been added
to the discussion. In direct response to Duff and Campbell's article,
John Robertson and Norman Frost published an article in 1976
advocating the largely philosophical view that a newborn, regardless
of how badly compromised he or she may be, has the right to life.
15
In their opinion, parental autonomy in concert with guidance from
physicians in making treatment decisions on behalf of disabled
infants went too far. 16 They emphasized a need for a set of
authoritative guidelines to guide decision-making to prevent mistakes
12. Id.
13. Id. at 894.
14. See generally Joseph W. Kaempf et al., Medical Staff Guidelines for Periviability Pregnancy
Counseling and Medical Treatment of Extremely Premature Infants, 117 PEDIATRICS 22, 23 (2006);
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Neonatal Resuscitation Prog. Steering Comm., Born-Alive Infants Protection
Act of 2001, Public Law No. 107-207, 111 PEDIATRICS 680 (2003); Hugh MacDonald & The Comm. on
Fetus and Newbom, Perinatal Care at the Threshold of Viability, 110 PEDIATRICS 1024 (2002); William
Oh et al., Perinatal Care at the Threshold of Viability, 96 PEDIATRICS 974 (1995).
15. See John A. Robertson & Norman Frost, Passive Euthanasia of Defective Infants: Legal
Implications, 88 PEDIATRICS 883 (1976); see also John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of
Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1975).
16. Robertson & Frost, supra note 15, at 887.
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or abuses of power. 7 As a result of these publications and
accompanying discussion, the once very private meeting in a small
NICU meeting room between parents and a physician regarding the
medical treatment plan of a barely viable infant was increasingly
entering the public domain.
B. A Federal Push to Preserve the Sanctity of Life
In 1982, the death of a severely handicapped child with Down
syndrome born six days earlier in Bloomington, Indiana, started a
firestorm of national debate and discussion regarding treatment of
extremely premature and disabled infants. 18 Indiana courts approved
the decision of Baby Doe's parents to forgo surgery to correct a
tracheoesophageal fistula' 9 and to withhold food and other nutrition,
effectively allowing the baby to die.
20
Outraged by the court's decision, President Ronald Reagan used
the case of Baby Doe as a call for his administration to employ
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prevent future
denials of treatment to disabled newborns. Coined "the Baby Doe
Rules" (or Regulations), Reagan's attempt to sway medical standards
of care was rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court in Bowen v.
American Hospital Association, et al.,2 1 which held, among other
things, that no evidence existed to indicate that a "discriminatory
withholding of medical care" was used in violation of section 504
and further, that the section did not authorize the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to "give unsolicited advice either to parents, to
hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult treatment
decisions" regarding handicapped or disabled children.22  Some
commentators went a step further, opining that the Court's decision
17. Id.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. A condition where the upper part of the esophagus is not connected to the lower part preventing
the intake of food.
20. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 425,
429 (2006).
21. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
22. Id. at611.
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BABY DOE AND BEYOND
held that the rules interfered with parental rights to decide what was
in their infant's best interest, thwarted individualized choices, and
were na'fve about proper medical decision-making. 23 Though this first
version of the Baby Doe Rules was struck down by the Court,
President Reagan did not give up.
After the Court's decision in Bowen, Reagan again attempted to
force physicians and health-care facilities to preserve the sanctity of
life when making medical treatment decisions by urging Congress to
amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).24
As passed, these federal funding regulations require all extremely ill,
premature infants less than one year of age to receive maximal
treatment unless any of three narrow exceptions is met.25 If a health-
care facility violated the terms of CAPTA, it theoretically could lose
valuable federal monetary grants.
26
Neonatologists and other physicians responded that the rules were
unnecessary to protect the rights of marginally-viable newborns and
failed to offer adequate consideration of the infant's physical
condition, ignored the rights of parents, and negated the Best Interests
Standard as a guide to make medical determinations. 27 The rules have
generated confusion among physicians about what practical and
philosophical factors they must consider when determining a proper
medical course of action.
28
23. Id; see also Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated
Persons ofAll Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 187, 191 (2007).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107, 5118 (2006).
25. See Kopelman, supra note 23, at 191. The three exceptions to providing maximum treatment are:
(1) if the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (2) treatment would merely prolong dying, not
be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be
futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (3) the provision of such treatment would be virtually
futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Loretta M. Kopelman, Thomas G. Irons & Arthur E. Kopelman, Neonatologists Judge the
'Baby Doe' Regulations, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 677, 677 (1988); Loretta M. Kopelman, Thomas G.
Irons & Arthur E. Kopelman, Neonatologists, Pediatricians and the Supreme Court Criticize the 'Baby
Doe' Regulations, in COMPELLED COMPASSION: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE TREATMENT OF
CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS 237 (Arthur L. Caplan, Robert H. Blank, Janna C. Merrick, eds. 1992).
28. See sources cited supra note 27.
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As recently as 2002, Congress yet again enacted legislation that
effectively interferes with parental autonomy to make medical
decisions on behalf of a marginally-viable newborn. The Born-Alive
Infants Protection Act of 2002 (BAIPA)29 was passed "to repudiate
the flawed notion that a child's entitlement to the protections of the
law is dependent upon whether the child's mother or others want him
or her."30 Initially understood by legislators and the medical
community to be an anti-abortion law, BAIPA eventually found its
way into the newborn delivery room. Under the terms of the Act,
resuscitation and other life-saving measures must be initiated on an
infant "born alive" if a heartbeat is detected or it otherwise shows
signs of life. 31 Thus, an extremely premature infant born with no
hopes of long-term viability must, according to BAIPA, be
administered maximal life-saving medical treatment, likely resulting
in a bad death or a severely disabled life.
C. The Role of Vitalism in Making Difficult Life or Death Decisions
The surge of vitalism, the belief that every individual life should be
preserved at all costs regardless of quality-of-life concerns, has only
largely permeated our society in the past quarter of a century.
Anthropologist Emily Martin contends that our culture underwent a
shift in the last thirty years from a focus on a "societal-good" (efforts
to benefit society as a whole) to the intensification of
individualization, as best seen from President Reagan's commitment
to protect the rights of each individual infant.32 This cultural shift has,
in part, led to an increased desire by patients and surrogate decision
makers to maximize health-care resources for an individual-often at
the expense of others who may benefit equally if not more from their
use. Parents expressing a vitalist belief want to maximize those
resources on a dying infant or an infant that may have a minimal or
29. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (2002).
30. H.R. REP. No. 107-186, at 3 (2001).
31. Id at 20.
32. Suzanne R. Kirschner, From Flexible Bodies to Fluid Minds: An Interview with Emily Martin, 27
ETHos 247, 266-67 (1999).
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even non-existent quality of life. In those instances, parents fervently
believe that life, in and of itself, is a good to be cherished and
upheld--even if the medical resources utilized are inflicting pain and
suffering on the infant. Parents attempting to preserve and promote
the sanctity of life ethic often clash with physicians or other health-
care providers, advocating practical medical concerns in the best
interests of the newborn. Such disagreements often lead to
litigation.33
D. A Personal Note
From personal experience, having a child in a hospital NICU is an
anxiety-filled experience. As a new parent, I watched my son struggle
to breathe his first breaths. He was not born prematurely, yet he
immediately developed a life-threatening condition. 34 After a quick
discussion of his condition and needed treatment with physicians and
nursing staff, he was then whisked away from my wife and me by
nursing staff before we had an opportunity to hold him and welcome
into the world. Placed in an incubator to receive warmth and much
needed oxygen, it would be over a week before my wife and I would
be able to touch him.
The medical condition that would have surely ended my son's life
thirty years ago, as it did my brother's when he was about four days
old, was treated by excellent physicians and medical staff taking
advantage of the latest technology and procedures. The physicians
were kind, informative, and reassuring. The treatment provided
33. See discussion infra Part HI.C-D.
34. The author's son was born Dec. 31, 2005, just over thirty-nine weeks' gestation and suffering
from respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) and persistent pulmonary hypertension (PPHT). When an
infant suffers from RDS, his or her lungs are not developed enough to produce surfactant, a liquid that
coats the inside of the lungs and keeps them open so that the baby can breathe in air. Without surfactant,
the lungs collapse and the baby has to work hard to breathe on his or her own. The extra work causes
persistent pulmonary hypertension where the blood vessels in the lungs constrict, and as a result there is
insufficient blood flow to the lungs and not enough oxygen reaches the blood. The author's son was
admitted to the NICU at Univ. Ala.-Birmingham (UAB) and received treatment spanning nearly ten
days. His son will turn three this December and is completely healthy. The author would like to thank
everyone in the UAB NICU who devotes his or her time to treating, saving, and sometimes saying
goodbye to newborns.
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allowed him to be placed on his own meaningful life path. But during
his nearly two-week stay in the NICU, my son was surrounded by
much more fragile infants whose futures were less hopeful. My wife
and I had to make difficult decisions regarding my son's treatment in
that small meeting room just outside of the NICU, but the decisions
we made pale in comparison to the agonizing decisions made by
parents, sitting on that blue vinyl couch, presented with a grim
outlook of their barely viable infant's future. Their once private
matter has culminated into a public discussion and debate regarding
whether their child should live a life, possibly lacking truly
meaningful relationships and experiences, or whether the child
should die with dignity and in peace. Physicians are on the front
lines, treating the expectant mother and subsequently delivered
newborn, making the medical determinations and recommendations
that often begin the decision-making process.
II. PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF THE INFANT'S PHYSICAL CONDITION
Not all extremely premature infants are born alike. This over-
simplified statement may appear obvious at first blush, but in the
context of survivability or the likelihood of having long-term
debilitating disabilities, it is precisely the vital differences in the
newborn's weeks of gestation, weight, gender, and other factors that
are crucial, practical variables physicians must weigh when making
medical treatment decisions and presenting treatment options to
parents. But even the wealth of information and experience gained in
the past century by neonatologists in treating fragile newborns has
created unanswerable questions.
Newborn medicine in the twentieth century produced a plethora of
medical curiosity and technological advances. 35 Today, neonatology
has evolved to where many of the same treatments that are
successfully provided to older children and adults are similarly
35. See EARL E. SHELP, BORN TO DIE? DECIDING THE FATE OF CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS 80 (The
Free Press 1986).
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36utilized in newborn medical practice. Historically, premature
infants who struggled to survive or even breathe were provided with
stabilization care so that the newborn "could declare itself a survivor
or nonsurvivor." 37 However, physicians capitalizing on the very latest
in technology and treatment procedures have moved beyond the
historic objective of simply providing better care to a modem
"pushing the envelope" in extending the survivability of barely viable
38neonates. Such actions have led some to label neonatologists as
self-appointed guardians for the rights of the borderline infant-
resulting in the diminution of compassion in favor of opportunism in
hospital NICUs. 39 Even though medical progress has been made in
the last thirty years to decrease morbidity rates of these infants,
knowledge and experience of neonatologists in determining the
neonates' survival prognosis or likelihood of having severe handicaps
remains problematic. 40
This Part of the Article examines the practical medical picture of
an extremely premature infant who is presented to a neonatologist or
other physician for medical treatment. These often-labeled "miracle
workers" are looked to by hopeful parents desiring a healthy child.
Physicians must not only assess the often hard medical facts of the
infant when making a determination of what care (if any) to provide,
but also juggle the emotional and psychological presence of less-
medically-informed parents.
A. Evolution of the Neonatology Subspecialty
Medical and technological developments in the pediatric
subspecialty of neonatology blossomed in the last century.
Concentration on the newborn and attention paid to reducing the rate
36. Id.
37. Id. at 82.
38. See MacDonald et al., supra note 14, at 1024.
39. See Kaempf et al., supra note 14, at 23 (referring to physician William Silverman who believes
some neonatologists' decisions are trumping those of the infant's parents).
40. See MacDonald et al., supra note 14, at 1024.
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of infant mortality yielded a wealth of medical understanding
ultimately used in clinical practice.4 '
Modem interest in the specialty care of newborns is traceable to
Pierre Budin, a French obstetrician who, in 1892, established what
today would be considered a well-baby clinic at Charite Hospital in
Paris.42 Budin's focus was on the basic problems associated with
premature birth including the infant's temperature, proper feeding,
and preventing and treating diseases. 43 He used a warm-air incubator
to keep premature infants warm, advocated breastfeeding in an
amount more than twenty percent of the infant's body weight each
day, and separated healthy and sick infants to guard against
infection. 44
In the first half of the twentieth century, research on the pathology,
physiology, clinical observations, growth, and outcomes of premature
infants set the stage for technologically advanced NICU centers in
major hospitals nationwide.45 Pediatricians rather than obstetricians
began providing more care for newborns.
46
The beginning of modem neonatology started approximately fifty
years ago.47 A booklet entitled Standards and Recommendations for
Hospital Care of Newborn Infants was first published by the
Committee on Fetus and Newborn (COFN) of the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) in 1948.48 Four years later, Virginia
Apgar presented a paper to multiple research societies about neonatal
assessment in the delivery room and helped to focus attention on the
newborn infant.49 Then, in 1960, Alexander Schaffer, M.D., wrote a
book on modem-day neonatology and is credited with coining the
41. SHELP, supra note 35, at 80.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id.
47. Alistair G.S. Philip, The Evolution of Neonatology, 58 PEDIATRIC REs. 799 (2005).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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term.50 "Also in the early 1960s, an important distinction was made
between small infants who were bom 'preterm,' ([under] 38 [weeks
of] gestation) and term infants who were small because of [other]
growth restriction[s]." 51
During the 1970s, newborn and maternal care improved. Mortality
rates declined, in large part, due to the availability of intensive care
for infants-including continuous monitoring of blood pressure, heart
rate, and breathing rate.52 "Social workers were brought onto the
neonatal team in an effort to 'humanize' care." 53 And tougher
questions were asked by ethicists about whether treatment should be
initiated or withheld from severely disabled newborns.54 In 1983,
Nicholas Nelson, M.D., commented that advances in the practice of
neonatology "brought the sick premature newborn infant to his
present state of respectability as a patient to be cared for, rather than
an object to be pitied." 55
Historically, parents have had little choice of medical treatment for
marginally-viable newborns due to the lack of effective medical
knowledge. 56 Medicine, for all practical purposes, was unable to
effectively intervene to rescue most of these patients. 57 Today,
however, medical advances in treatments can now be used to
transform many sick babies into healthy ones-from an infant at the
edge of viability into a child with an uncertain quality of life. And it
often starts with physicians assessing the single most important
factors in extremely premature infants at the time of delivery-birth
weight and gestational age.
58
50. Id. at 800; see also ALEXANDER J. SCHAFFER, DISEASES OF THE NEWBORN (Mary E. Avery & H.
William Taeusch, Jr. eds., W.B. Saunders Company 1960).
51. Philip, supra note 47, at 800.
52. Jeannine Wyszkowski, The Legal Rights of Disabled Infants to Receive Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. U. 181, 181-82 (2004).
53. SHELP, supra note 35, at 83.
54. Id.
55. See Philip, supra note 47, at 800 (citing N.M. Nelson, Perinatal Medicine, 1 HIST. R. & RECENT
ADVANCES IN NEONATAL & PERINATAL MED., 3-8 (1983)).
56. SHELP, supra note 35, at 77.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 86; see also Jon E. Tyson et al., Intensive Care for Extreme Prematurity--Moving Beyond
Gestational Age, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1672 (2008); Nicholas S. Wood et al., Neurologic and
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B. Categories of Extremely Premature Infants and Their Likelihood
of Survival and Disability
Generally, premature infants are born at or before thirty-seven
weeks of gestation-three weeks earlier than the forty weeks required
of a full-term pregnancy. 59 Infants weighing under 2,500 grams, or
nearly six pounds, at delivery are termed Low Birth Weight (LBW)
infants.6 ° Smaller newborns weighing under 1,500 grams, or nearly
three and one-half pounds, at the time of delivery are termed Very
Low Birth Weight (VLBW) infants.61 Finally, the most fragile
infants, Extremely Low Birth Weight (ELBW), are those weighing
less than 1,000 grams, or slightly over two pounds and are typically
the youngest-born at twenty-seven weeks of gestation or less.62
1. Infants Born Between Twenty-Two and Twenty-Seven Weeks of
Gestation
"The application of neonatal intensive care to extremely premature
infants, ([under] 27 weeks of gestation) is a fundamental controversy
in neonatology." 63 In most NICU centers nationwide, decisions on
whether to provide intensive care are often made on the basis of the
specific gestational age or weight of the infant.64 In one study, male
infants born at twenty-two weeks' gestational age and weighing 600
grams had survival rates of approximately fifteen percent.65 Often,
the difficulty is medically seeing the marginally-viable newborn
through his or her first thirty days of life that ultimately determines
Developmental Disability After Extremely Preterm Birth, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 378 (2000);
MacDonald et al., supra note 14; William Oh et al., supra note 14; Timothy R. Cooper et al., Actuarial
Survival in the Premature Infant Less Than 30 Weeks' Gestation, 101 PEDIATRICS 975, 975 (1998).
59. George T. Mandy, Incidence and Mortality of the Premature Infant, UpToDate.com,
http://www.uptodate.com/patients/content/topic.dotopicKey---c_PwZVBWkjEWHEw (last visited
Sept. 4, 2009).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Kaempfet al., supra note 14, at 23.
64. See Tyson et al., supra note 58, at 1672.
65. See MacDonald et al., supra note 14, at 1025.
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survival.66 Even those that initially survive often die shortly thereafter
as a result of medical complications such as chronic lung disease,
intracranial hemorrhage, and respiratory distress syndrome (RDS).
6 7
Thus, "the great majority of providers [do] not recommend
resuscitation of premature infants born [before twenty-four weeks] of
gestation.,68
A recent medical study concluded that the likelihood of a favorable
outcome for extremely premature infants provided with intensive care
can better be estimated by consideration of four factors in concert
with gestational age: sex of the infant, exposure or non-exposure to
antenatal corticosteroids, whether born as part of a single or multiple
birth, and birth weight.69 If the infant was a single birth female with a
slightly higher birth weight, the risk of death or impairment
dramatically decreased. 70 Also, each one-week increase in gestational
age significantly increased the infant's chance of survival regardless
of the sex of the child. 71 The study, conducted on infants weighing
less than 1000 grams at birth, reiterated physicians' practice of
providing "comfort care" to infants born at twenty-two weeks of
gestation or less and only providing more aggressive care to infants
born twenty-three to twenty-four weeks of gestation with parental
agreement.72
2. Likelihood of Long-Term Disability
The high adverse outcome rates for infants born at less than
twenty-five weeks of gestation leads many physicians to question
whether aggressive medical treatment, including resuscitation, should
66. See Cooper et al., supra note 58, at 976 (noting that in an actuarial study conducted on extremely
premature infants, survival improved from 31% at birth to 58% on day 7 of life, and then to 75% on day
of life 28).
67. See Kaempfet al., supra note 14, at 23.
68. Id. at 25.
69. See Tyson et al., supra note 58, at 1672.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1673.
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be provided to any of these extremely premature infants. 73 Even if the
newborn survives, long-term neurodevelopmental outcomes are
poor.74 Often, the incidence of increased severe impairment including
mental retardation, cerebral palsy, blindness and deafness
accompanies survival. 75 According to one medical study conducted in
2003, ninety-two percent of infants born at twenty-three to twenty-
four weeks of gestation had some moderate to severe abnormal
neurologic, psychomotor, or mental development problems.76 Rates
of disability decreased with each additional gestational week of the
newborn.77
Birth weight also dramatically affects an infant's handicap
prognosis. Infants with birth weights of less than 750 grams have a
significant chance of experiencing long-term disabilities. 78  Almost
eighty percent will experience some type of respiratory distress
syndrome (RDS) and will need oxygen as long as twenty-eight days
after birth.79 Additionally, nearly one-half of all ELBW infants have
some type of major neurosensory or neurodevelopmental
impairment.
80
Doctors and hospital staff "must be willing to discuss the inability
of current NICU care to prevent poor outcomes." 81 Hospital and
NICU medical guidelines and policies should reflect the need for
physicians and other staff to have clear, consistent, and medically
accurate discussions with parents regarding possible quality of life
issues facing a newborn and to offer supportive treatment options
73. Monique Rijken et al., Mortality and Neurologic, Mental and Psychomotor Development at Two
Years in Infants Born Less Than 27 Weeks' Gestation: The Leiden Follow-Up Project on Prematurity,
112 PEDIATRICS 351, 351 (2003).
74. See Kaempfet al., supra note 14, at 23.
75. Id. at 24.
76. See Rijken et al., supra note 73, at 351.
77. Id. Infants born at twenty-five weeks of gestation had a 64% chance of impairment; those born at
twenty-six weeks had a 35% chance and those born between twenty-seven and thirty-two weeks had an
18% chance of some disability. Id.
78. Michael Battin et al., Has the Outcome for Extremely Low Gestational Age Infants Improved
Following Recent Advances in Neonatal Intensive Care?, 15 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 469, 476 (1998).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Kaempfet al., supra note 14, at 28.
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including comfort or palliative care alternatives. 82 Further, physicians
should consider how best to answer a parent's question about whether
providing additional treatment would be futile.
C. The Difficulty in Defining Medical Futility
It is a very difficult to define medical futility, although there has
been a good deal of medical and legal scholarship devoted to defining
it in recent years.83 The term has prompted many medical experts
(and non-experts) to attempt to formulate a hard-and-fast definition to
the term.84 However, such attempts have only lead to increased
confusion and to the conclusion that it is virtually impossible to
identify a workable definition applicable to all cases. 85 Michael Ewer,
M.D., offers the following definition of futility and notes its
ineffectiveness:
Medical futility is the state that existed in a terminally ill patient
for whom everything even remotely plausible, including heroic
interventions, was subsequently tried, a patient for whom every
proven and investigative therapeutic and supportive modality had
been utilized, and who, despite all efforts (and not because of
them) died. The fact that this definition is retrospective allows it
to be ideally specific; no survivors can ever be treated in cases in
which the criteria of medical futility will have been met. The
82. John M. Lorenz, Compassion and Perplexity, 113 PEDIATRICS 403, 404 (2004) (noting that
parents are the rightful decision makers of medical treatment options for a child).
83. See generally Nora O'Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility
Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 527 (2008); Lisa L. Dahm, Medical
Futility and the Texas Medical Futility Statute: A Model to Follow or One to Avoid?, HEALTH L. Aug.
2008, at 25; John M. Zerwas, Jr., Medical Futility in Texas: Handling "Reverse Right-to-Die'" Obstacles
Without Constitutional Violation, 43 TULSA L. REv. 169 (2007); Patrick Moore, An End-of-Life
Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment That
Physicians Are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REv. 433 (2007); Maureen Kwiecinski, To Be or Not
To Be, Should Doctors Decide? Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Futility Policies, 7 MARQ.
ELDER'S ADVISOR 313 (2006); Thomas William Mayo, Living andDying in a Post-Schiavo World, 38 J.
HEALTH L. 587 (2005).
84. See Mayo, supra note 83, at 600.
85. Michael S. Ewer, The Definition of Medical Futility: Are We Trying to Define the Wrong Term?,
30 HEART & LUNG 3 (2001).
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definition is also totally useless in that it is clinically irrelevant;
by the time we recognize futility to be present, the patient is
already dead.
8 6
Ewer aptly reasons that in seeking a universal definition of medical
futility, physicians are attempting to draw a hard line on a
continuum. 87 Predicting whether a patient will defy statistical odds
and improve when such improvement appears to be beyond the realm
of possibility, is impossible.
88
Making medical futility determinations often includes analysis of
statistical and physiologic variables affecting the patient. For
example, does the infant have a twenty percent chance of survival if
provided with a certain medical treatment? In the context of an
extremely premature infant, if a physician concluding that a twenty-
two week newborn has a ten percent chance of survival if provided
with maximal medical intervention, the treatment cannot be said to be
physiologically futile.8 9 Thus, according to neonatologist Sadath
Sayeed, such decisions at the time of birth are ethically problematic
and speculative because they are made before any degree of certainty
about the infant's diagnostic and prognostic outcomes can be
properly ascertained through some medical treatment or
intervention.
90
In the often ego-driven and emotional-charged specialty of
neonatology, consensus regarding the probability of survival will
always be in question regarding marginally-viable infants. 91 Some
physicians earnestly believe attempting to rescue an imperiled infant
with only a ten percent chance of profoundly disabled survival to be
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Sadath A. Sayeed, The Marginally-Viable Newborn: Legal Challenges, Conceptual
Inadequacies, and Reasonableness, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 600,604 (2006).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 605.
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reasonable while others recommend against resuscitation of those
infants with less than a fifty percent chance of intact survival.
92
Instead of a rigid term applicable to all cases, physicians should
strive to define a meaningful cutoff point for when, in the course of
treatment, continued therapeutic benefit is no longer reasonable. 93 In
searching for such a cutoff point, neonatologists, using their
education, background, and experience, must assess the infant's
physical condition and balance a number of intersecting interests to
make a medical determination of whether to provide a fragile
newborn with aggressive, life-sustaining treatment or provide
"comfort care," providing for the infant's basic needs but foregoing
painful and therapeutically marginal medical procedures.
D. Physicians at the Crossroads of Intersecting Interests
When adversity afflicts a newborn, parents often turn to
neonatologists whose powers are called upon to engender health for
the infant. For suffering parents, the presence and reassurance of
neonatologists can sometimes instill meaning to a situation that
appears meaningless. Their task is to negotiate a medical reality for
the infant that often includes pain, suffering, sickness, and perhaps
death.94 Sometimes, parents and physicians conflict in what each
believes is the proper course of medical action or when a parent
refuses to let go of a life. Thus, physicians are often placed at an
intersection of competing interests. Not only must they do what is in
the best medical interests of the newborn, but often they must act as
counselors to parents-providing comfort, reassurance, and hope.
They also are frequently looked upon by a third party or
governmental agency that may not only seek to override their
treatment decisions, but also bring civil or criminal charges against
them if they act improperly.95 The specific identification and rank-
92. Id.
93. See Ewer, supra note 85, at 3-4.
94. See SHELP, supra note 35, at 88.
95. Id.at9l.
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order of these often competing interests may never be identical from
one physician to the next or from one case to the next.
96
A physician advising a parent that he or she has done everything
medically possible and additional treatment provided to the newborn
would likely have no beneficial effect is sometimes met with
resistance and insistence by the parents that more is done to allow the
baby to survive. Such beliefs from a parent may arise from an
unwillingness to let a child go, from a sincere belief that some
treatment must be beneficial, and often from a belief that the child's
life is worth preserving at all costs--even if continued treatment may
inflict pain and suffering.
III. THERAPEUTIC ILLUSIONS AND THE ROLE OF VITALISM:
PRESERVING LIFE AT ANY COST
Most parents heed the medical advice provided by treating
physicians who recommend that no treatment be provided because an
infant's life (should it be saved) would be too compromised to be
worth the effort. 97 In some cases, however, the collaborative
decision-making approach between parent and physician is
ineffective due to a core emotional belief of the parent that the
infant's life should be preserved at all costs. A parent does not want
to give up hope that a child may survive or that a cure can be found.
It is difficult to argue with the notion that a parent would seek out
every medical possibility to ensure the survival of his or her child.
Some parents often endlessly pursue aggressive treatment for an
infant that will provide no beneficial end. They do this because they
refuse to acknowledge the grim reality of the infant's medical
condition, they believe that the child will ultimately improve
medically, or they seek to uphold the sanctity of the infant's life at
any cost.
96. Id. at 92.
97. Sayeed, supra note 89, at 608.
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This Part of the Article examines two parent-focused belief and
value systems that can dramatically impact the future of an ailing
extremely premature infant. The first, known as therapeutic illusion,
is the psychological belief that continued medical treatment is (or will
be) beneficial to the infant, even in light of medical evidence that
suggests otherwise. The second, vitalism, is the value system that
holds the sanctity of life should be upheld irrespective of the potential
harm caused to the infant and despite the financial, emotional, or
psychological costs incurred. It will further analyze two legal battles
waged between a parent demanding medical treatment be provided to
her child and health-care facilities refusing. Though they are not
cases dealing with extremely premature infants, Sun Hudson and
Emilio Gonzales reflect the conflict resulting from a parent who, as a
result of a therapeutic illusion or vitalist beliefs, ignores the bleak
medical reality facing her child in favor of the idea that the child's
life, regardless of quality, must be preserved.
A. Therapeutic Illusions: Hope in the Face of Stark Medical Reality
Medical ethicist William Winslade artfully states that our culture's
common belief, when faced with the prospect that a loved one's
medical treatment may be futile, is to "never give up hope," despite
current medical literature and standards.98 Such a belief has been
coined a "therapeutic illusion," a phenomenon first labeled by K.B.
Thomas. 99 According to Thomas, a "doctor himself is a powerful
therapeutic agent," who often equates slight improvement of a
medical condition to the treatment being provided-even when it is
not true. 100 Thus, parents often grasp onto the false notion that their
child's health is improving as a result of the diagnosis made by a
98. See William J. Winslade, What to Do With Our Real-Life Rip Van Winkles?, HOuS. CHRON.,
Apr. 11, 1996, at 25A; see also Stacey A. Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the Law and
Ethics of Treatment, Research, and Public Policy in the Context of Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 14
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 27 (2004).
99. K.B. Thomas, The Consultation and the Therapeutic Illusion, I BRIT. MED. J. 1327, 1328
(1978).
100. Id.
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physician and the treatment subsequently provided.10 Even in the
face of clear and undeniable facts that further medical treatment
would not be beneficial, family members often hold out hope that
their child will "beat the odds."'
0 2
Health-care providers "not infrequently find themselves in the
conundrum of providing futile care to a hopelessly ill patient."' 1 3 It is
a frustrating endeavor made worse by the possibility that family
members may seek continued medical treatment indefinitely.' 04 There
is often very little a physician can say or do to alter the therapeutic
illusion of a parent who adamantly believes in the power of hope
against all odds.
B. Vitalism: Life As an Intrinsic Good To Be Preserved
Similar to the concept of therapeutic illusion, a parent may believe
that his or her infant's life, regardless of the pain endured, is a good
worth preserving in and of itself.10 5 Instead of relying on a false
notion that a course of medical treatment is beneficial to the patient, a
vitalist holds the deeply personal belief any human life is precious
and should be prolonged as long as possible at any cost despite the
grim medical reality facing the infant.
l0 6
101. Id.
102. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007); see also Clare Dyer, Doctors Need Not
Ventilate Baby to Prolong His Life, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 995, 995 (2004) (reporting that two mothers of
terminally ill infants rejected medical advice because their babies were "'fighters' . . . [and] had lived
longer than doctors had predicted"); Todd Ackerman, Hospital Rules to Unplug Baby Girl: Leukemia
Patient's Parents Scramble to Find New Care Facility, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2005, at B1 (reporting
that the mother of Knya Dismuke-Howard, a six-month old girl with leukemia in her brain, multiple
organ failure, and a life-threatening antibiotic-resistant infection stated, "I think she can beat the odds ..
•. She's a fighter...").
103. Stanley A. Nasraway, Unilateral Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Is It Time? Are We
Ready?, 29 CRrIICAL CARE MED. 215, 215 (2001).
104. Id.
105. See Nancy Y. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375, 442-43 (1988) ("A
vitalist believes that life, in and of itself, is a good worth preserving.").
106. Tovino & Winslade, supra note 98, at 26-27; see also WILLIAM 1. WINSLADE, CONFRONTING
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY: DEVASTATION, HOPE, AND HEALING 25, 117 (1999); see generally Alicia
R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of Incompetent
Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 ND. L.J. 1 (2004) (arguing against a vitalist
approach).
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As evidenced by the passage of the Baby Doe regulations in the
early 1980s, vitalism is deeply entrenched in our culture. 107 A strict
vitalist asserts that life itself is paramount to any quality-of-life
considerations and would dictate the continuation of medical
treatment even if to do so would be extraordinarily painful or
intrusive.10 8  "The vitalist aggressively defends human biological
existence."
10 9
Individuals holding a vitalist view often do so as the result of
religious or moral instruction. Historically, the Judeo-Christian
tradition has attempted to place medical vitalism on a continuum-a
"middle path" between preserving life at all costs and ending life
when it seemed futile. 110 Roman Catholic theologian Richard
McCormick notes that life is indeed a precious good, but a relative
one, and the duty to preserve it, a limited one.11' "These limits have
always been stated in terms of the means required to sustain life.""
' 12
Pope Pius XII recognized the limits of providing medical treatment in
futile cases."l 3  However, in recent years, the Catholic Church has
promoted a more rigid approach to the sanctity of life issue. In the
context of the abortion discussion, Pope John Paul II approved an
instruction on respect for human life which read in part:
107. See generally Ouellette, supra note 106.
108. Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, (Mis)Framing Schiavo As Discrimination Against
Persons with Disabilities, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 789, 817 (2007); see also Kathleen M. Boozang, An
Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in Dying, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 568
(1997).
109. Ouellette, supra note 106, at 21 (quoting Larry Gostin, A Moment in Human Development: Legal
Protection, Ethical Standards and Social Policy on the Selective Non-Treatment of Handicapped
Neonates, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. 31, 37 (1985)).
110. RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modem Medicine, in
BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 70, 72 (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert
R. Johnson, & Robert A. Pearlman eds. 1997); see also Gostin, supra note 109, at 37 (Gostin defines a
continuum of vitalist thought from the most robust or pure, requiring all heroic or extraordinary
measures, to the more moderate which "recognizes that decisions affecting individual human life are
already made as a consequence of allocating scarce health care resources").
111. MCCORMICK, supra note 110, at 72.
112. Id.
113. Id. In an allocution to physicians in 1957, the Pontiff noted that only ordinary means are required
to preserve life: "A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men and would render the
attainment of the higher, more important good too difficult." Id.
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The human being is to be respected and treated as a person from
the moment of conception; and therefore from that same moment
his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the
first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being
to life.
1 14
Thus, it can be argued that Pope John Paul II was a strict vitalist-
holding "non-treatment as intentional termination of life, which is
prohibited. Consequently, [he] would mandate continued medical
treatment in every instance, irrespective of the patient's condition."" 5
Conversely, Pope Pius XII could be said to have been a moderate
vitalist-recognizing a justifiable decision to let an infant die when
the costs of preserving life were overly burdensome and deemed
extraordinary and nonobligatory.1"
6
Those holding more moderate vitalist views when faced with
making medical decisions on behalf of a marginally-viable infant
allow for discussion regarding the future quality of life of the child.
Entering into the equation is the extent to which the child will have
meaningful human relationships. McCormick advocates that a life is
possibly not worth living if such "human relationships... would be
so threatened, strained, or submerged that they would no longer
function as the heart and meaning of an individual's life .... ,117 He
adds that it is neither inhuman nor unchristian to say that there comes
a point where an individual's medical condition renders the person
unable to have any human relationship potential:
When that point is reached, is not the best treatment, no
treatment? In this tradition, life is not a value to be preserved in
and for itself. To maintain that would commit us to form of
114. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin
and on the Dignity of Procreation Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (Feb. 22, 1987),
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc19870222_resp
ect-for-human-lifeen.html.
115. See Boozang, supra note 108, at 568.
116. See McCoRMicK. supra note 110, at 72-73.
117. Id. at 73.
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medical vitalism that makes no human or Judeo-Christian sense.
It is a value to be preserved precisely as a condition for other
values, and therefore insofar as these other values remain
attainable. Since these other values cluster around and are rooted
in human relationships, it seems to follow that life is a value to
be preserved only insofar as it contains some potentiality for
human relationships.18
However, a parent making such a decision on behalf of a child is
asked to give up, give in, and let go of hope; it is a decision parents
are often not willing to make. Wanda Hudson, the mother of Sun
Hudson, refused to consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment being provided to her ailing son.
C. The Case of Sun Hudson
In 2004, a severely disabled and dying infant born in Houston,
Texas, became the focus of widespread media attention when a
mother demanding treatment be provided to her son was pitted
against physicians and a health-care facility that believed life-
sustaining care was adding to the child's suffering. 19 Wanda Hudson
believed that her son's condition would improve, despite medical
evidence that undoubtedly indicated otherwise.
Sun Hudson was born at St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital with short
appendages, an enlarged head, and significant respiratory distress. 120
Sun's mother, Wanda, had received no prenatal care prior to giving
birth and was unaware that her son would be born with significant
physical and mental disabilities. 121 Sun was immediately transferred
to Texas Children's Hospital where he was placed on a respirator and
a feeding tube was inserted. 122 Genetic testing revealed that Sun was
118. Id. at 131.
119. See Zerwas, supra note 83, at 179-80.
120. Lance Lightfoot, Incompetent Decisionmakers and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: A
Case Study, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHics 851, 852 (2005).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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born with thanatophoric dysplasia, a rare and fatal condition affecting
some 60,000 births. 123 Most infants affected by the condition die
shortly after birth because the baby's narrow chest cavity restricts its
ability to breathe-slowly worsening until the infant suffocates to
death. 124 Additionally, most infants with the condition have severe
mental and physical disabilities. 12
5
Complicating matters was Wanda's insistence that her son was a
"special" child and conceived by the sun in the sky, not by another
human.126 Shortly after giving birth, Wanda was involuntarily
committed to a psychiatric hospital for evaluation; however, not
finding her to be a threat to herself or others, she was released and
resumed visiting her son at Texas Children's Hospital. 127 Upon her
return, Sun's physicians informed Wanda of his condition, his
negative prognosis, and recommended the withdrawal of life-
sustaining care. 128 Wanda refused and accused physicians and
nursing staff of wanting to murder him. 129 Additionally, members of
the hospital's social work department and clergy spoke with Wanda
in an effort to assist her in coping with her son's likely death. 1
30
Wanda steadfastly refused to acknowledge the medical facts affecting
her son, advice given by the treating physicians, and simply prayed
for a change.
131
Fewer than two months later, the Texas Children's Hospital
Bioethics Committee convened to discuss Sun's case as an example
of medically inappropriate treatment being provided and causing the
123. Id; see also Dahm, supra note 83, at 28.
124. Lightfoot, supra note 119, at 852.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Dahm supra note 82, at 28.
130. Lightfoot, supra note 120, at 852.
131. Id; see also Leigh Hopper, No Easy Calls When Baby Is Terminally Ill: Local Case Casts Light
on Dilemma of Hospitals, Parents in Disputes Over Ending Treatment, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2005, at
Al.
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child excessive pain.132 The committee, following Texas law, 133
notified Wanda that it would discontinue medical care of Sun within
ten days, unless another health-care facility could be located to accept
transfer of the infant.' 34 After being granted several extensions by the
hospital to locate a facility willing to accept Sun, Wanda was finally
denied a final extension and thereafter sought legal counsel.135
Concerned that Wanda did not fully understand the gravity of the
situation, the hospital assisted her in obtaining (and paying the legal
fees of) an attorney. 136
Wanda Hudson sued Texas Children's Hospital seeking injunctive
relief and monetary damages. 137 Specifically, Wanda sought an order
requiring the hospital to provide continued life-sustaining treatment
to her son.' 38 A temporary injunction requiring the hospital to provide
continued care for five months was granted. 139 However, on March
14, 2005, the probate judge hearing the case held there was no
reasonable expectation that another health care provider would agree
to continue treatment if time were extended. 140 The ruling essentially
allowed the hospital to withdraw the life-sustaining treatment keeping
Sun alive. On March 15, 2005, Texas Children's Hospital removed
Sun's life support and he died moments later in his mother's arms. 14 1
Neonatologist Sadath Sayeed recognizes the inherent difficulty
parents like Wanda Hudson face when attempting to decide the fate
of their child's life:
... [T]his 'intractable' bioethical dilemma does start with the
recognition that parents, not physicians, bioethicists, or judges,
132. See Amir Halevy & Amy L. McGuire, The History, Successes and Controversies of the Texas
"Futility" Policy, 43 HOuS. LAW. 38,40 (2006); see also Hudson v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W.3d.
232, 233 (Tex. App. 2005).
133. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Texas Advance Directives Act).
134. See Halevy & McGuire, supra note 132, at 40.
135. See Moore, supra note 83, at 461.
136. Id.
137. See Hudson, 177 S.W.3d. at 234.
138. Id.
139. See Halevy & McGuire, supra note 132, at 40.
140. Id.
141. See Moore, supra note 83, at 461.
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are forced to gamble (with rather poor odds) sacrificing their
own child's life as well as their own life projects because of the
ready availability of sophisticated medical technology and skill
142
Even a parent who is not under a therapeutic illusion will have an
agonizing choice to let his or her child die without ensuring that all
medical options to cure or save have been exhausted. 143 The inherent
slippery-slope, however, is that physicians, upon the demands of a
parent, may initiate a therapeutic course of action even though saving
a marginally-viable infant is statistically improbable. 1" Another
Texas case highlights the inherent conflict between parent and health-
care provider.
D. The Case of Emilio Gonzales
Approximately eight months after the death of Sun Hudson, Emilio
Gonzales was born blind, deaf, and developmentally delayed in
Austin, Texas. 145 Emilio suffered from Leigh's Disease, a rare,
inherited, and fatal neurometabolic disorder that collapses the
individual's central nervous system. 146 The progressive disorder
begins in infants between the ages of three months and two years.
147
Early signs of the disease include loss of head control and motor
skills, seizures, and poor sucking ability. 148 As the disorder
progresses, the individual loses muscle tone and incurs episodes of
lactic acidosis-leading to respiratory and kidney function
impairment. 149 Although there is limited treatment consisting of the
142. See Sayeed, supra note 89, at 607.
143. Id. at 608.
144. Id.
145. Mary Ann Roser, Boy's Short Life to Have Lasting Impact, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 21,
2007, at BI.
146. Nat'l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, NINDS Leigh's Disease Information Page,
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorderseighsdisease/leighsdisease.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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administration of thiamine or Vitamin B1, the prognosis for infants
with Leigh's Disease is poor. 150 Some individuals with a less severe
case have lived to six or seven years of age.15' Unfortunately,
Emilio's case was more advanced.
On December 27, 2006, at approximately twelve months of age,
Emilio was admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) of
Children's Hospital of Austin, Texas, suffering from a collapsed
lung; he was placed on a ventilator and a nasogastric tube was
inserted.152 Without assistance from the ventilator, Emilio would die
within minutes or hours.153 For the next several months, heavy doses
of medication were administered to the fragile infant. '1 4 While
Emilio's mother, Catarina, was sure that her infant son would often
smile, a hospital nurse believed that he was grimacing in pain. 1
55
Attending physicians and hospital staff attempted to discuss
Emilio's certain fate with his mother, but Catarina was resistant to the
recommendation that her son's life support be discontinued. 156 Often
combative with hospital staff, she called them "murderers."'
' 57
However, after several months of treatment physicians believed to be
futile and painful, 158 the hospital's Ethics Committee concluded that
continued aggressive treatment was unwarranted and sought to
invoke the Texas Advance Directives Act-allowing the hospital to
discontinue Emilio's life support. 159 Hospital officials attempted to
find a facility willing to accept Emilio "without any single indication
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Eileen E. Flynn, Dying Boy's Case Likely to Reverberate in Law, Religion, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Apr. 15, 2007, at Al.
153. Sylvia Moreno, Case Puts Texas Futile-Treatment Law Under a Microscope, WASH. POST, Apr.
11, 2007, at A3.
154. Id.
155. Elizabeth Cohen, Fight Over Baby's Life Support Divides Ethicists, CNN.com, Apr. 25, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/ 2007/HEALTHI04/25/baby.emilio/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
156. Mary Ann Roser, A Young Life, Already Shortened, in Dispute at Hospital, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Mar. 7,2007, at A1.
157. Id.
158. See Mary Ann Roser, Child's Guardian Supports Doctors, Hospital, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
May 9, 2007, at BI.
159. See Dahm, supra note 83, at 29; see also Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2007).
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of interest in taking the transfer."' 60 Catarina Gonzales countered by
filing a lawsuit against the hospital asking that the court find the
Texas law unconstitutional and requesting that the hospital continue
to provide life-sustaining treatment. 16 1 During the pendency of the
lawsuit, Emilio died in his mother's arms on May 19, 2007, before
the judge could make a final ruling.' 62
E. Who Should Decide? Conflicting Views
Although the Texas Advance Directives Act was the legal means
utilized in the Sun Hudson and Emilio Gonzales lawsuits to challenge
the withdraw of life support, the crux of the debate centered on who
had the right to determine whether futile care should continue. In
Emilio's case, Michael Regier, Senior Vice President for Legal
Affairs and general counsel for the Seton Family of Hospitals, of
which Austin Children's Hospital is a member, said that the treatment
provided was inflicting suffering upon the infant. 163 "We are
inflicting harm on this child. And it is harm that is without a
corresponding medical benefit. '164 But Emilio's mother disagreed
saying that her son was on heavy doses of morphine and was not in
any pain. 1
65
Emilio's case generated heated discussions among medical experts,
ethicists, and others with experiences similar to that of Catarina
Gonzales. Even the siblings of Tern Schiavo, the Florida woman in a
persistent vegetative state who generated national debate when family
members disagreed over the continuation of futile medical treatment,
weighed in and supported Ms. Gonzales. 166 Art Caplan, an ethicist at
the University of Pennsylvania who supported the hospital, stated that
160. Moreno, supra note 153, at A3.
161. Dahm, supra, note 83, at 29.
162. Id.; see also Mary Ann Roser, Emilio's Life Raises Issues of Care's Cost, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, May 28, 2007, at BI.
163. Cohen,supra note 155.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Moreno, supra note 153.
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sometimes "family members just don't get it right."' 67 "No parent
should have the right to cause suffering to a kid in a futile situation,"
said Caplan. 168 But Lainie Ross, a pediatrician and medical ethicist at
the University of Chicago, stated that Emilio's mother, not the
treating physicians or health-care facility, ought to decide the medical
treatment path for her son. 169 "Who am I to judge what's a good
quality of life?" said Ross. 7 0 "If this were my kid, I'd have pulled the
ventilator months ago, but this isn't my kid.'
17 1
Even religious figures failed to reach a consensus regarding
whether Emilio's life support should be discontinued. Bishop
Gregory Aymond, of the Austin Catholic diocese, stated that "[t]he
Catholic Church would teach if there is no possibility of recovery,
that extraordinary means can be withdrawn, and it's not taking the
life of a person, but simply allowing them to die naturally and with
dignity.''472 However, orthodox Father John Trigilio disagreed
slightly, writing:
This is a difficult case . . The moral obligation is always to
give normal care and use ordinary means to treat the sick and the
dying . . . .Extraordinary means, like the ventilator, may be
refused while ordinary means cannot be refused. Once in place,
however, if the extraordinary means are sustaining life, I do not
think it is morally permissible to remove already operational
extraordinary means .... Once the respirator (or ventilator) is
turned on... I do not think it can be turned off if it will directly
cause death .... Preventing death is not always obligatory when
167. Cohen, supra note 155.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Jim Bergamo, Ethical, Moral Questions Over Life Support Fight, KVUE.com, Apr. 19, 2007,
http://www.kvue.com/newslocal/stories/04l907kvueemilio-bkm.26766bcb.html.
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there is no reasonable hope of recovery, but directly causing
death is always considered killing and is therefore immoral.
173
In Emilio's case, such discussion was not welcomed by the infant's
mother, Catarina, who refused to heed any advice provided by clergy,
physicians, or others recommending withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. Catarina stated, "every moment of life he [had] to spend
with her [was] of inestimable value.' 74 Catarina's belief that
Emilio's life was worth preserving was actually, in part, a self-
centered notion while ignoring the bleak medical reality facing her
child. 175 To Catarina, her son's life (whether he was in pain or not)
had immense value.
There is little doubt that, aside from the opinions of pro-death
penalty advocates, life should be preserved when possible. It is an
entity to be cherished. After all, religious, moral, and ethical
teachings instruct us not to commit murder and to otherwise do no
harm. Often, however, some lives of extremely premature and
marginally-viable infants are fraught with pain, suffering, and
struggling to survive at the edge of life. If providing medical
treatment would be beneficial in assisting the infant on his or her
meaningful life path, based upon prevailing medical standards and
the facts presented, then it should be provided. However, there often
comes a point when a newborn's medical condition renders the child
unable to have any human relationship potential. In those gray areas
surrounding the unknown future of a marginally-viable infant,
physicians and parents often turn to the ethical norm: the 'best
interests' of the child, to guide medical decision-making.
173. Matt C. Abbott, Priest-author Comments on Emilio Gonzales Case, RENEW AM., Apr. 23, 2007
(on file with author).
174. Verified Complaint, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hosp., No. A07CA267, 2007 WL 1622769 at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2007) (emphasis added).
175. See Francis & Silvers, supra note 108.
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IV. MAKING DECISIONS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE INFANT
The inherent difficulty in fashioning a workable definition of
medical futility, in part, can similarly be found in a lack of consensus
surrounding the Best Interests Standard used when making medical
treatment determinations on behalf of a marginally-viable
newborn. 176 Although the concept of best interests is well-accepted
in pediatric ethics, debate and controversy often arises in practice
regarding how one may determine an infant's best interests. 17 7 Should
it be the physician deciding what is in the best interests of an
imperiled newborn, or the child's parents? The standard seemingly
invokes a combination of practical, medical facts from the physician
and philosophical, moral, and quality-of-life factors from the parents.
This Part of the Article examines the Best Interest Standard from
both the physician's and parents' perspective when faced with
making medical decisions on behalf of an extremely premature infant
and how to best reach a consensus.
A. The Controversy Surrounding the Standard
Medical experts agree the goal of neonatal medicine is to minimize
both over-treatment and under-treatment of the extremely premature
infant and to approach a medical decision-making process in the best
interests of the infant.178 However, as is the case with defining
medical futility, there is no widespread agreement on how best to
employ the term. 179 Professor Loretta Kopelman notes that some
commentators believe the standard requires ideal treatment be
provided and nothing less.180 Others, including Kopelman, argue such
176. See Sayeed, supra note 89, at 605; Ferdinand D. Yates, Jr., Medical Decision Making for the
Marginally Viable Infant, 10 VIRTUAL MENTOR 673, 674 (2008), available at http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2008/1 0/oped 1-0810.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
177. Steven R. Leuthner, Decisions Regarding Resuscitation of the Extremely Premature Infant and
Models of Best Interest, 21 J. PERINATOLOGY 193, 197 (2001).
178. Id. at 193.
179. See Kopelman, supra note 23, at 187.
180. Id. (citing R.M. Veatch, Abandoning Informed Consent, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. 2005, at
32).
20091 1133
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1133 2008-2009
] Y E  OND 1133 
I  I I S I       T 
 t t    l   f 
i l t,  l rl    f s 
i g  r    
t i   lf  ll - iable 
  t   ts ted 
i  ,   tice 
i   i e t's t t . 7   
i i   t t t    
 r , '  t   l  
ti  ti l,   
l, li   
  l  i s     
 '  ts'   
    l   t 
  
t rsy ing r  
   i  i  
t ent t ent   
  i    
  ,  
,  t  
    
t t rs    t  
. 18  , ,  
,  i l i     
inal y t,  il le l t r.a a-
l O l-081O l , . 
. isions r ing it tion  t  t l  ature I f t  
 t rest, 1  ,  . 
  
, ra t  , t . 
 . . ,  f  nt, I   p., ar. , t 
. 
37
Conway: Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical In
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a rigid explanation is impractical; instead, she argues, the standard
requires a decision maker to do what is reasonable given the
circumstances.' 81 Kopelman states:
The Best Interests Standard should be understood as an umbrella
principle covering different kinds of usage . . . . It can be
employed to express moral, legal, medical, or other social goals
or ideals that should guide choices .... Second, it can be used in
making practical and reasonable decisions about what should be
done in a particular situation, given the available (and usually
less than ideal) options. 182
However, one vague term apparently leads to another; what may be
reasonable to a physician may not be equally reasonable to a parent.
The seemingly endless number of questions generated from
determining the best interests of a borderline neonate has led some
physicians to dismiss the standard altogether. The former chairperson
of the AAP Committee on Bioethics, Joel Frader, has stated:
I doubt that insisting on the reliance on the Best Interests
Standard gets us very far. Best interests, similar to art or
pornography, tends to mean whatever the beholder believes it to
mean. The term has no independent substance, and we should not
fool ourselves into thinking that it alone improves decision-
making. 1
8 3
Indeed, the best interests of a newborn in the eye of a physician may
be drastically different when viewed by a parent. There are thus two
reasonable, yet competing interpretations of what is in the best
interests of the infant.' 84 The stalemate, however, does not resolve
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Sayeed, supra note 89, at 605; see also Joel E. Frader, Baby Doe Rules: In Reply, 116
PEDIATRICS 1601-02 (2005).
184. See Sayeed, supra note 89, at 606.
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how best to approach a dire medical situation facing a marginally-
viable newborn. Ethicist John Paris, a long-time advocate for
retaining informed parental and physician choice in cases of
extremely premature infants, has argued that each actor, physician
and parent, must reach a consensus using their respective areas of
expertise-medical facts and prognosis from the physician and
moral, religious, and quality-of-life concerns from the parents-to
determine what is in the best interests of the infant:
There is now a strong consensus in the medical, legal, and ethical
literature that it is the best interests of the infant-not the desires
of the parents or the determination of the physician-that must
prevail in the care of newborns .... Translated into practice, this
standard means that if the burden on the infant is overwhelming
or the prospects are extremely bleak, as is true in the presence of
a lethal abnormality, there is no obligation to subject the infant to
further procedures. 1
85
Collaboration among physicians and parents best allows for a
determination of what is overwhelmingly bleak in each circumstance.
The probability that an infant will expect a lifetime of mental
retardation or blindness does not necessarily translate into a life not
worth living, let alone deemed overwhelmingly bleak, to some
parents. 86 A best interests analysis may be easiest when death is
inevitable for there is little uncertainty regarding the infant's future.
Such is not the case when an imperiled newborn has a ten percent
chance of surviving, if severely disabled, through rescue
treatments. 187 The questions and decision-making only get more
difficult in such situations.
185. John J. Paris, Michael D. Schreiber, & Frank E. Reardon, Ethical and Legal Issues, in ASSISTED
VENTILATION OF THE NEONATE 81 (Jay P. Goldsmith & Edward H. Karotkin, eds.) (4th ed. 2003).
186. See Sayeed, supra note 89, at 605.
187. Id.
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B. The Appropriate Best Interests Approach
One of the most widely accepted methods of using the Best
Interests Standard is a shared decision making process in which the
physician, using his or her medical expertise, guides the family
through the treatment process, adhering, as much as possible, to the
parents' value system.' 88 Steven Leuthner, M.D., argues:
We must allow parents to interpret the meaning of the prognosis
given and decide for their children. We, as physicians, must
recognize our moral agency. We may agree or disagree with
parental values, but we must work with parents and within
societal and professional rules in deciding what actions
determine best interest. 
89
When a borderline case is evident, the physician should collaborate
with the parents and jointly explore the infant's medical diagnosis
and prognosis in the confines of parental values and morality. This
"negotiated model" encourages "an enhanced autonomy that consists
of listening to and sharing perspectives, accepting the physician's
authority to offer recommendations, and obligating physicians to
fully understand parental reasoning."' 190 In doing so, writes Leuthner,
the child as a whole is fully valued-not simply the life of the
child. 191
The negotiated model has its drawbacks, however. It may allow
parental values to always prevail in conflicts over decision making.
Parental love can have different motives and potential pathology,
creating conflict between the medical team and the parent. Vitalist
beliefs or therapeutic illusions expressed by a parent may demand
aggressive medical treatment be provided to an ailing infant though
an experienced neonatal team finds such treatment to be medically
188. See Leuthner, supra note 177, at 196.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 197.
191. Id
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inappropriate or even cause pain and suffering. Physicians and
health-care facilities should be prepared for such scenarios through
comprehensive hospital policies and guidelines.
Other factors, such as federal law, additionally affect treatment
decisions of an extremely premature infant and are often dismissive
of the Best Interests Standard. The Baby Doe rules enacted in the
early 1980s are representative of such initiatives.
V. THE BABY DOE SAGA
The quandary of neonatal rescue medicine intensified in the early
1980s, when governmental intervention in treatment decisions
involving critically ill newborns became a matter of widespread
public concern. The most notorious of the cases involved a disabled
infant born on April 9, 1982, in Bloomington, Indiana. 192 Forever to
be known as Baby Doe, the infant was diagnosed with Down
syndrome and a tracheoesophageal fistula-a condition preventing
oral feeding. 193 Without necessary surgery to repair the handicap,
Baby Doe was certain to die. The newborn's parents were told by the
obstetrician that "if the surgery were performed and if it were
successful and the child survived, that this still would not be a normal
child. That it would still be a mongoloid, a Down syndrome child
with all the problems that even the best of them have."'
194
The parents refused to consent to treatment, and hospital staff
sought a court order to override the parents' decision.' 95 The Indiana
Supreme Court ruled that the parents had the right to make medical
decisions on behalf of their child. 196 Baby Doe died on April 15,
192. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Ind. Apr. 12, 1982) (deferring to
parental decision to withhold treatment for a disabled newborn), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); see
also George J. Annas, The Baby Doe Regulations: Governmental Intervention in Neonatal Rescue
Medicine, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 618, 618 (1984).
193. See Annas, supra note 192, at 618.
194. See Bagenstos, supra note 20, at 429 (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVqL RIGHTS, MEDICAL
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 21-23 (1989)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
20091 1137
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1137 2008-2009
) Y  D 1137 
i t    
r    
sive   
 ll   
     
   
 ti   
  
       
, l ti   
    r a  
      
,    
 
 ageal  i  
 r    
'    
      
  
 l  
r l  that even the best of them have.,,194 
t   
  ' 1  
  
 , 
.       
t   r ), rt. ied, );  
l  , i s: t l tion tal  
i ine, u . 
.    
.  t ,  t  ,    . . '   I  ,  
  W   I I   ». 
. d. 
. d. 
41
Conway: Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical In
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1983, when he was six days old.197 The court's decision sparked
outrage among right to life and disability groups.' 98 Soon after,
President Ronald Reagan weighed in on the issue and inserted his
influence into medical decision-making by enacting regulations in an
attempt to prevent future Baby Doe cases from occurring. Public
discussion and debate ensued, bringing normative neonatal medical
practice from the NICU into the public domain.
This Part of the Article chronologically examines how the Baby
Doe regulations have evolved in the past twenty-five years and their
resulting impact on modern treatment decisions involving
marginally-viable newborns.
A. President Reagan's Public Response to the Baby Doe Decision
In the spring of 1983, President Ronald Reagan penned an article
for The Human Life Review, in which he reflected on the tenth
anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade.199 Arguing that "abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by
the Constitution," President Reagan called for the American people to
steadfastly express their opinions that all human life is sacred and,
thus, worth preserving at all costs. 20 0 "Once we as a nation... affirm
the sanctity of life, we will see the importance of affirming this
principle across the board," wrote Reagan.20 '
President Reagan did not, however, limit his pro-life comments to
the debate surrounding abortion. He proactively denounced any
argument offered in favor of the "quality of life" ethic potentially
affecting premature and disabled newborns at the edge of viability.2
0 2
"It is not for us to decide who is worthy to live and who is not,"
wrote Reagan. 203 Reagan argued:
197. Id.
198. See Annas, supra note 192, at 618.
199. Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, THE HUM. LIFE REV.,
http://www.national review.com/document/reagan200406lOlO3O.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
200. Id
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Every legislator, every doctor, and every citizen needs to
recognize that the real issue is whether to affirm and protect the
sanctity of all human life, or to embrace a social ethic where
some human lives are valued and others are not. As a nation, we
must choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the 'quality of
life' ethic.
204
In advocating his position, Reagan narrowed his sights on Baby
Doe.20 5 Although the infant had a much more complex medical
diagnosis and prognosis than Reagan stated in his article, the former
president blasted the Indiana Supreme Court ruling, stating the
decision confirmed that Baby Doe's "retardation was the equivalent
of a crime deserving the death penalty. ' 20 6 Reagan noted:
The death of that tiny infant tore at the hearts of all Americans
because the child was undeniably a live human being-one lying
helpless before the eyes of the doctors and the eyes of the nation.
The real issue for the court was not whether Baby Doe was a
human being. The real issue was whether to protect the life of a
human being who had Down[] syndrome, who would probably
be mentally handicapped, but who needed a routine surgical
procedure to unblock his esophagus and allow him to eat.
207
President Reagan used the case of Baby Doe as a call to arms for
members of Congress and his administration to preserve the sanctity
of human life at every legislative opportunity. 20 8 By his own words,
President Reagan noted the intent behind the subsequently-
promulgated Baby Doe regulations: "[t]he basic issue is whether to
value and protect the lives of the handicapped, whether to recognize
204. Id.; see also PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR
TRADrrIONAL ETics 106 (1994) (quoting Reagan, supra note 198).
205. Reagan, supra note 199.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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the sanctity of human life., 209 Reagan and his administration would
spend the next several years attempting to make good on his
statement.
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In the immediate aftermath of Baby Doe's death, the Secretary of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
wrote a letter to approximately 6,800 hospitals informing them that
the agency was invoking Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which stated, in part:
No otherwise qualified [handicapped] individual ... shall, solely
by reason of... his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.210
The section made it
[U]nlawful . . . for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to
withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-
threatening condition if: (1) [t]he withholding [was] based on the
fact that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap [did] not
render treatment or nutritional sustenance medically
contraindicated." 211
Hospital noncompliance with the new interpretation of the civil rights
law theoretically could result in loss of federal funds.212 In
209. Id.
210. 87 Stat. 394, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1983).
211. Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of
Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027-02 (June 16, 1982).
212. Id.
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announcing the policy, then DHHS Secretary Richard Schweiker
said:
The President has instructed me to make absolutely clear to
health care providers in this nation that federal law does not
allow medical discrimination against handicapped infants.21
3
In March 1983, DHHS revised its Interim Final Rule
contemplating a "vigorous federal role," 214  by requiring the
conspicuous display of a notice in each delivery and maternity ward,
pediatric ward, nursery, and intensive care nursery, indicating a toll-
free "hotline" number that encouraged reporting of apparent
discriminatory treatment to disabled newborns. 215 "When reports
came in, 'Baby Doe Squads' . . . were dispatched to hospitals,
demanding medical records" and investigating alleged
mistreatment.216 Officials from the DHHS were given authority to
take "immediate remedial action" to protect the infant, and hospitals
were required to provide access to their facilities, medical records,
and personnel to investigators.217
The Interim Final Rule, incorporating many of these policies and
procedures, took effect on March 22, 1983, and was subsequently
legally challenged by the American Hospital Association and others.
The suit was brought against DHHS and its new secretary, Margaret
Heckler, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, to enjoin the enforcement of the Interim Final Rule. 218 Similar
suit was brought by the AAP and other medical institutions against
DHHS and Heckler in the District Court for the District of
213. Around the Nation; US. Warns Hospitals On Care of Handicapped, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/19/us/around-the-nation-us-wams-hospitals-on-care-of-
handicapped.html?sec=health.
214. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (Mar. 7, 1983).
215. See Annas, supra note 192, at 618.
216. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 33.
217. See Annas, supra note 192, at 618 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (Mar. 7, 1983)).
218. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F.Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The New York lawsuit would be
the basis for the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc.
discussed infra in Part V(D).
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Columbia.219 The District of Columbia court struck down and
declared the Interim Final Rule "arbitrary and capricious and
promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 22 °
District Judge Gerhard Gesell personally noted that the regulation's
primary purpose required "physicians treating newborns to take into
account wholly medical risk-benefit considerations and to prevent
parents from having any influence upon decisions as to whether
further medical treatment is desirable. 22' Without appealing the
court's ruling, DHHS revised the regulations and invited public
comment.
"After the period for notice and comment had elapsed, [D]HHS, on
December 30, 1983, promulgated the Final Rules and announced they
would take effect on February 13, 1984."222 Although with slightly
less sting than its predecessors, the Final Rules maintained the spirit
of earlier drafts by requiring, among other things, federally assisted
state child protective services agencies to utilize their "full authority
pursuant to State law to prevent instances of medical neglect of
handicapped infants. 223 Of importance to this Article, the Final
Rules were not intended to apply to severely premature and low birth
weight infants and parents; they only applied to:
(1) refusals to provide treatment or nourishment to handicapped
infants whose parents have consented to, or requested, such
treatment; and (2) the failure or refusal to take action to override
a parental decision to withhold consent for medically beneficial
treatment or nourishment.
224
The guidelines stated that the hospital "may not 'solely on the basis
of the infant's present or anticipated future mental or physical
impairments, fail to follow applicable procedures on reporting such
219. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F.Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
220. Id. at 400.
221. Id.; see also Annas, supra note 192, at 618.
222. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 620.
223. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,849 (1983); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 610, 619.
224. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 615, n.4.
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incidents to the child protective services agency or to seek judicial
review."' 225 After DHHS's Interim Final Rule had been declared
invalid in Heckler but prior to the Final Rules being promulgated in
late 1983, a child with multiple birth defects was born in Long Island,
New York.
C. Baby Jane Doe
On October 11, 1983, an infant known as Baby Jane Doe was born
with multiple congenital defects including spina bifida,
hydrocephalus, microcephaly, and other neurological defects in Long
Island, New York.226 Without corrective surgery, the probability of
her surviving more than a few weeks was unlikely.227 After
consulting with her treating physicians, Baby Jane Doe's parents
decided to forgo surgery that was likely to prolong her life, but would
not improve many of her other handicapping conditions. 228 A Long
Island resident, unrelated to the family, filed suit in Suffolk County
Supreme Court, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the infant to demand the hospital perform the surgery.229 The trial
court granted the relief requested by the guardian on October 20th,
but was reversed the following day by the Appellate Division, which
found that the "concededly concerned and loving parents" had
"chosen one course of appropriate medical treatment over another"
and made an informed decision that was "in the best interests of the
infant. 23 ° Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.23'
While the state proceedings were ongoing, DHHS "received a
complaint from a 'private citizen' that Baby Jane Doe was being
discriminatorily denied" needed medical treatment and immediately
referred the matter to the New York State Child Protective Service.
232
225. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84, Appendix C, (a)(4) (1985)).
226. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
227. See id.
228. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 621.
229. Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 589.
230. Id.
231. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 456 N.E.2d 1186, 60 N.Y.2d 208 (1983) (per curiam).
232. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 621.
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The agency investigated the medical neglect charge and concluded
there was no cause for state intervention. 233 At the same time, DHHS
demanded the hospital make its medical records available for
inspection in order to determine whether it was in compliance with
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.234 The hospital refused and the
government subsequently filed suit in Federal District Court on
November 2, 1983.235
The District Court in United States v. University Hospital of the
State University of New York at Stony Brook ruled against the
government, reasoning that the hospital had "at all times been willing
to perform the surgical procedures in question, if only the parents...
would consent."236 Thus, the surgery was not denied because Baby
Jane Doe was handicapped, but because her parents refused to
consent to the procedure.237 The Court of Appeals affirmed noting:
"[C]ongress never contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act would apply to treatment decisions involving defective newborn
infants when the statute was enacted .... It thus rejected "the far-
reaching position advanced by the government" and concluded that
until Congress had spoken, "it would be an unwarranted exercise of
judicial power to approve the type of investigation that .
precipitated this lawsuit. ' 239 The government decided against filing a
certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court; instead, it
sought judicial review from the high Court in the previously-decided
American Hospital Association v. Heckler240 case in New York. That
case, along with others, were consolidated into Bowen v. American
Hospital Association, et al. 2
41
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See United States v. Univ. Hosp. of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 575 F.Supp. 607
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
236. Id. at 614.
237. Id.
238. United States v. Univ. Hosp. of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d
Cir. 1984).
239. Id.
240. 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984).
241. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
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D. Bowen v. American Hospital Association, et al.
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Bowen v.
American Hospital Association, et al.,242 expressed harsh criticism of
the Reagan Administration's attempts to unilaterally make medical
treatment decisions on behalf of disabled infants by noting the
regulations interfered with parental rights to decide what was in a
child's best interests.243 The Court noted how DHHS had changed its
stance from once opposing parental rights in making medical
treatment decisions on behalf of a disabled infant to embracing the
concept. Justice Stevens wrote:
In the immediate aftermath of the ... Baby Doe incident, the
Secretary [of DHHS] apparently proceeded on the assumption
that a hospital's statutory duty to provide treatment to
handicapped infants was unaffected by the absence of parental
consent. He has since abandoned that view... Indeed, it would
almost certainly be a tort as a matter of state law to operate on an
infant without parental consent. 244
Now that the Secretary had acknowledged requisite parental consent
for a hospital to provide treatment to an infant, opined Justice
Stevens, it was clear that the Final Rules "are not needed to prevent
hospitals from denying treatment to handicapped infants."245 The
Court's rationale in striking down the regulations was premised on
the finding that the failure of DHHS to recognize that "withholding
of consent by parents did not equate with discriminatory denial of
treatment by hospitals," and thus, did not support the Secretary's
claim that federal regulation is needed in order to prevent future Baby
242. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
243. Id. at 632.
244. Id. at 630 (citation omitted).
245. Id. at 631 ("The Secretary's belated recognition of the effect of parental nonconsent is important,
because the supposed need for federal monitoring of hospitals' treatment decisions rests entirely on
instances in which parents have refused their consent.").
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246Doe and Baby Jane Doe cases. The Court concluded that the
Secretary lacked the authority under section 504 to "dispense with the
law's focus on discrimination and instead to employ federal resources
to save the lives of handicapped newborns, without regard to whether
they are victims of discrimination by recipients of federal funds or
not."247 The Court went on to note that "[s]ection 504 does not
authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents, to
hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult treatment
decisions concerning handicapped children.,
248
As a result of the Court's decision in Bowen, the Reagan
Administration's pro-life stance was undermined. The Administration
turned to legislators to find an alternative route to preserve the
sanctity of life.
E. The CAPTA Amendments: Baby Doe Rules Part II
In 1985, a Democrat controlled House and a Republican controlled
Senate adopted a set of Baby Doe rules as amendments to the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).249 Understood
primarily as federal funding requirements for states to receive
monetary grants, the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984250 required
states to establish policies and procedures for the reporting of and
responding to medical neglect and by defining medical neglect to
include the withholding of medically indicated treatment for a
disabled infant with life-threatening conditions. 251 These regulations
attempted to dictate medical treatment of extremely ill, premature, or
terminally ill infants less than one year of age-requiring maximal
treatment unless one of the following exceptions is met:
246. Id. at 632.
247. Id. at 611.
248. Id; see also Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or
Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797, 798 (2005).
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107, 5118 (2006).
250. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984).
251. Id.
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(1) [t]he infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(2) [t]reatment would merely prolong dying, not be effective
in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-
threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of
the survival of the infant; or
(3) [t]he provision of such treatment would be virtually
futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the
treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane.2
52
Determining the meaning of "chronically and irreversibly comatose,"
"futile," and "virtually futile" has proven difficult for clinicians and
little guidance in interpreting the terms has been provided by the
government. Whether "virtually futile" is narrowly interpreted to
mean a one percent chance of survival or more liberally to mean a
five percent chance of survival directly impacts a physician's medical
decision-making.253 It is unclear from a reading of the rules.
Additionally, "reasonable medical judgment" is narrowly defined
only to allow application of the three exceptions; the definition does
not allow parents and physicians to decide what is reasonable.254
Since their enactment, the amendments have brought both criticism
and praise from medical and legal commentators alike. Some
applauded the legal measure as a commitment to respecting human
life regardless of disability.255 Others denounced the rules as being
too distant from the reality of clinical decision making,
256
252. See Kopelman, supra note 23, at 191; see also HHS Final Rules: Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to the Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 50 Fed.
Reg. 14,888 (Apr. 15, 1985).
253. See Jon Tyson, Evidence-Based Ethics and the Care of Premature Infants, 5 Low BIRTH
WEIGHT 197, 200 (1995), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2827/
information-show.htm?docid=80057 (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).
254. See Kopelman, supra note 23, at 192.
255. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 34; see also Mercy, Murder, & Morality, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov./Dec., 1989.
256. Stanley J. Reiser, Survival at What Cost? Origins and Effects of the Modem Controversy on
Treating Severely Handicapped Newborns, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 199,209 (1986).
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inconsistent with regulations affecting incompetent adults, 257 or too
dismissive of parental autonomy in making medical decisions on
behalf of a child.258
Professor Loretta Kopelman and her colleagues surveyed United
States neonatologists to determine whether the revised Baby Doe
rules would affect their medical decision making in the NICU.259 Of
the nearly 500 respondents, a majority of physicians felt the rules
reduced parental rights to consent to or refuse treatment based on the
infant's best interests. 260 Approximately sixty percent of physicians
believed the rules did not allow for adequate consideration of the
infant's physical condition, i.e., its pain and suffering, and more than
one-half of the respondents felt the infants would be overtreated
when survival was improbable. 261 When asked a hypothetical
question of whether the use of a respirator should be continued for a
550-gram infant who had developed seizures, a large hemorrhage in
the brain, and had a five percent chance of survival with severe
handicap, thirty percent of neonatologists felt the law required the
continued use of the respirator, eighteen percent were uncertain, and
twenty-three percent noted that the rules had changed their approach
to such a scenario.262
Although uncertainty abounds among many neonatologists
regarding how best to apply the Baby Doe rules to clinical practice, it
is clear that "the norms of [neonatal] practice have shifted: physicians
and hospitals [are] now more reluctant to defer automatically to
parental wishes." 263 Yet, many physicians resist this notion and
refuse to alter their medical practice standards as a result of federal
257. Gary E. Jones, Do the 'Baby Doe' Rules Discriminate Against Infants, 17 PEDIATRICIAN 87, 91
(1990).
258. See Kopelman, supra note 23, at 191; Loretta M. Kopelman, Arthur E. Kopelman, & Thomas G.
Irons, Neonatologists Judge the 'Baby Doe' Regulations, supra note 27; Veatch, supra note 180.
259. Loretta M. Kopelman, Arthur E. Kopelman, & Thomas G. Irons, Neonatologists Judge the 'Baby
Doe' Regulations, supra note 27.
260. Id. at 677 (sixty-six percent of neonatologists believed the rules diminished parental autonomy).
261. Id. at 677, 679.
262. Id. at 678.
263. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 34.
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coercion.264 For them, the Best Interests Standard remains intact; the
standard permits families and physicians some latitude regarding
what should be medically done even if the infant is neither comatose
nor imminently dying.
265
The first and only known judicial interpretation of the CAPTA
Baby Doe rules was conducted in a Wisconsin's Appellate Court
review of Montalvo v. Borkovec.2 66 The case concerned an extremely
premature infant born at twenty-three weeks and three days of
gestation, who was given maximal lifesaving treatments. The parents
sued, claiming that their permission for these interventions was not
sufficiently informed. The Wisconsin Appellate Court, however,
stated: "[t]he implied choice of withholding treatment, proposed by
the [parents], is exactly what CAPTA prohibits."267 The Court further
restricted an interpretation of the Best Interests Standard, writing:
"[i]n the absence of proof of a persistent vegetative state, our courts
have never decided it is in the best interests of a patient to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining medical care."
268
Some commentators note that the Wisconsin Appellate Court in
Montalvo interpreted the CAPTA Baby Doe rules as the drafters
intended: diminished parental autonomy, reduced consideration of
infant suffering and future quality of life, and expanded use of NICU
resources for infants with an improbable survival.269
Despite commentary from pro-life advocates and Baby Doe rule
supporters stating the rules allow for reasonable and appropriate
treatment choices, there appears to be widespread uncertainty and
confusion in the medical community regarding the precise influence
the rules should have on normative neonatal practice as evidenced by
Kopelman's survey of neonatologists.
264. See Jason Morrow, Making Mortal Decisions at the Beginning of Life: The Case of Impaired and
Imperiled Infants, 284:9 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1146, 1147 (2000).
265. See Loretta M. Kopelman, Baby Doe Rules: In Reply, 116 PEDIATRICS 1602, 1602 (2005).
266. 647 N.W.2d 413 (2002).
267. Id. at419.
268. Id at 421.
269. See Tyson, supra note 253, at 200.
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F. Impact of the Rules on Modern Medicine
As an opponent of the Baby Doe rules since their inception,
ethicist Loretta Kopelman has written extensively on the subject.27 °
She notes that the AAP Committee on Bioethics believes many
neonatologists have misunderstood these regulations in clinical
practice. 27 1 The AAP advocates neonatologists employ a Best
Interests Standard when making medical determinations on behalf of
an imperiled newborn, and Kopelman notes that the committee
believes the Baby Doe rules are not in contradiction to that
standard.272 Kopelman writes:
The committee claims that the Baby Doe rules allow
considerable discretion and are consistent with individualized
decision-making by clinicians and parents using the best-
interests standard. This view is considered and rejected because
these rules thwart individualized decision-making. 273
Kopelman concludes that the committee is incorrect in its
assumption, noting the rules do not allow the sort of discretion that
they claim.274 The rules are only consistent with the Best Interests
Standard if it is assumed, as it was by President Reagan, that
providing maximal medical intervention to marginally-viable infants,
regardless of the long-term consequences, is in their best interests.275
To date, the second set of Baby Doe rules remains legally
unchallenged but they continue to be hotly debated in the medical
and legal community. Some commentators state the rules are an
appropriate and reasonable method to ensure proper medical decision
270. See Kopelman, supra note 23; Kopelman, supra note 265; Kopelman, supra note 248; sources
cited supra note 27.
271. Kopelman, supra note 248, at 798.
272. Id. at 801.
273. Id. at 798. For the APP Committee's view, see American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on
Bioethics, Ethics and the Care of Critically Ill Infants and Children, 98 PEDIATRICS 149-53 (1996).
274. Kopelman, supra note 248, at 801.
275. See id.
1150 [Vol. 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1150 2008-2009
1  I     ( l. 2 :  
. t t  ern icine 
s  t   i  
t i i t   t 27o 
 t  t   i  
t l ists  i t  i  l  
71  
I terests t r   i  i l   
 i ril  ,   
li s t      
t r .27   
he co ittee clai s t t t    l   
si r l  i r ti     li  
i i - i    
interests standard. his vie  is c si ere   r j t   
these rules th art individualized decision-making.273 
el a  l  t t t    
ss ti , ti  t  l     
they clai .27  e r l s r  l  i t t it    
ta ar  if it is ,  it   t  
r i i  i l i l i t ti  i ll - iable  
regardless of the long-ter  consequences, is in their best interests.275 
 ate, t  s  t    ll  
c alle ed t t  ti  t    t   
a  le al it .  t t rs    
appropriate a  r s l  t  t   r   
270. See Kopelman, supra note 23; opel an, supra note 265; el a , s r  t  ; r s 
it   t  . 
271. opel an, s r  te , at . 
2. I . t . 
273. Id. at 798. For the PP o ittee's ie , s  rican ade y  i trics, ittee  
Bioethics, Ethics and the Care a/ ritically III Infants and hildren, 98 I TRICS -53 (1996). 
274. opel an, supra note 248, at . 
275. ee id. 
54
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/4
BABY DOE AND BEYOND
making is conducted.276 Others disagree, stating the rules limit
clinician and parental discretion to withhold or withdraw treatment
deemed to not be in the best interests of the imperiled infant.277
President Reagan's ideal that every human being is valued equally
is an admirable societal goal to be certain. But it is an ideal deeply
flawed and virtually unattainable in today's society. It ignores the
gray areas present in modem-day neonatal medicine where parents
must decide between the death of a child and the choosing a life
lacking meaningful human relationships, exorbitant financial
assistance, and constant care. A premiere example is the case of
Sidney Miller.
VI. SIDNEY MILLER: A CASE STUDY
Today, Sidney Miller is a teenager, yet she cannot walk, talk, feed
herself, or sit up on her own.278 She is legally blind in one eye, and
has a range of vision of only a few feet in the other.279 She suffers
from cerebral palsy, seizures, and spastic quadriparesis in her
limbs. 280 She has severe mental retardation and will have the mental
capacity of a six-year-old for the remainder of her life.28' She has a
surgically implanted shunt in her skull to drain fluid leaking from her
brain.282 And her mother, Karla, provides twenty-four hour care to
change her diapers, feed and clothe her, and take care of her needs.
Sidney's circumstances will never change. The Millers do not have
the financial means to adequately cover the cost of Sidney's ongoing
medical treatment.283 The hospital that delivered her refused to follow
276. See generally Thomas H. Murray, The Final Anticlimactic Rule on Baby Doe, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June, 1985, at 5-9; Robertson, supra note 5.
277. See Kopelman, supra note 248, at 798.
278. See Holly O'Neal Rumbaugh, Miller v. HCA, Inc.: Disempowering Parents From Making
Medical Treatment Decisions for Severely Premature Babies, 41 Hous. L. REv. 675, 696 (2004); see
also Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tex. 2003).
279. Rumbaugh, supra note 278, at 696.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See Rumbaugh, supra note 278, at 697.
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her parents' requests that no heroic measures be taken to save her
extremely premature life.
This Part of the Article details the premature birth of Sidney Miller
and subsequently delivered medical treatment initiated over the
objections of her father, Mark, as well as the resulting litigation
leading to the Texas Supreme Court, as an example of conflict
occurring between parents, physicians, hospital administration, and
state and federal law.
A. Sidney's Birth
On August 17, 1990, Karla and Mark Miller presented themselves
to the Woman's Hospital of Texas, in Houston, Texas, with Karla
284experiencing symptoms of premature labor. Karla was four
months before her scheduled due date.285 An ultrasound revealed that
Karla's fetus weighed approximately 629 grams, or slightly over one
pound, and had a gestational age of about twenty-three weeks. 286
Physicians immediately administered a drug to Karla to stop labor.287
Although her premature labor ceased, physicians subsequently
discovered that Karla had an infection threatening to take her life and
that of her unborn daughter.288 Karla's obstetrician, Mark Jacobs,
M.D., and a neonatologist, Donald Kelley, M.D., informed Karla and
Mark that if they had to induce delivery, the infant would have had
little chance of being born alive.28 9 The physicians informed the
couple that, even if born alive, the infant would most likely suffer
severe impairments including brain hemorrhaging, blindness, lung
disease, pulmonary infections, and mental retardation.29 °
After their discussion, Drs. Jacobs and Kelley asked the Millers to
decide whether the newborn should be aggressively treated upon
284. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. 2003).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 761-62 (Tex. 2003).
290. Id. at 762.
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delivery; at approximately noon that day, the Millers informed the
physicians that "no heroic measures" were to be performed on the
infant and instructed them to let "nature take its course."291 Dr.
Kelley memorialized the Millers' request in the medical record, and
Dr. Jacobs informed other medical staff that no neonatologist would
be needed at delivery.292 Mark then left the hospital to make funeral
arrangements for the infant.
293
Alarmed by the notation in the medical record, the nursing staff
notified other hospital personnel and administrators, and an afternoon
of meetings ensued to discuss what should be done. Around 4:30 p.m.
that afternoon, Mark was advised by Anna Summerfield, director of
the NICU, that a hospital policy, as well as state and federal law,
required the hospital to resuscitate any infant born weighing more
than 500 grams. 294 When Mark requested a copy of the policy, he
learned that it was an unwritten policy.295 When asked by the Millers
how they could prevent resuscitation and other measures from being
taken on the newborn, hospital officials informed them that they
would need to transfer Karla to another facility.296 However, Karla's
obstetrician had made it clear that transfer was not a viable option
given Karla's worsening condition. 297
What concerned the physicians (as well as the hospital
administrators) was the ethical dilemma of not providing any medical
treatment without first observing the newborn's condition.298 As Dr.
Jacobs testified:
[W]hat we [an ad hoc hospital committee] finally decided that
everyone wanted to do was to not make the call prior to the time
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 762 (Tex. 2003).
295. Id. ("Although Summerfield agreed that she said that, the only written Hospital policy produced
described state law and did not mention anything related to requiring resuscitation to infants over 500
grams.").
296. Id. at 763.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 762.
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we actually saw the baby. Deliver the baby, because you see
there was this [question] is the baby really 23 weeks, or is the
baby further along, how big is the baby, what are we dealing
with. We decided to let the neonatologist make the call by
looking directly at the baby at birth.
299
Mark refused to consent to resuscitation or other medical treatment
be provided to the infant.300 Dr. Jacobs then noted in the medical
record that a plan of evaluation would begin upon the birth of the
newborn.3° '
That evening, Karla's amniotic sac broke and physicians
determined that labor would need to be induced to prevent further
complications. 302 At 11:30 that night, Karla delivered a premature
female infant weighing 615 grams, whom the Millers named
Sidney.30 3 Sidney's gestational age was twenty-three and one-seventh
weeks. 30 4 The neonatologist, Eduardo Otero, M.D., noted that Sidney
had a heart beat, "was blue in color and limp, gasped for air,
spontaneously cried, and grimaced. 30 5 The physician also noted that
Sidney displayed no dysmorphic features other than being premature;
he immediately "bagged" and "intubated" Sidney and placed her on
ventilation.30 6 When asked at trial why, the physician responded:
Because this baby is alive and this is a baby that has a reasonable
chance of living. And again, this is a baby that is not necessarily
going to have problems later on. There are babies that survive at
this gestational age that-with this birth weight, that later on
go on and do well.
307
299. Id.
300. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. 2003).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. 2003).
306. Id.
307. Id.
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Otero's testimony seemingly conflicted with the medical opinions
previously given to the Millers before Sidney's birth. Neither Karla
nor Mark objected at the time the treatment was administered by
Otero.3 °8
Sidney initially responded well to treatment, but within the first
few days after birth, she suffered a brain hemorrhage-a common
occurrence in extremely premature infants.3 °9 It was unclear whether
the hemorrhage resulted from the medical treatment provided or in
spite of it.310 Regardless, as predicted by her physicians, Sidney
suffered severe physical and mental impairments that remain with her
today.
B. The Lawsuit
Karla and Mark Miller sued the Woman's Hospital of Texas and
its parent company, Hospital Corporation of America, Inc., and
subsidiaries (collectively HCA, Inc.), asserting claims of battery and
negligence. 311 The Millers decided not to pursue legal action against
any of the physicians, including neonatologist Eduardo Otero who
312performed the life-sustaining treatment. When asked by the media
why they chose not to bring suit against the physicians, Mark Miller
responded that he and Karla believed "the doctors just did what they
were told" to do by hospital officials. 313 The physicians were
involved in the litigation only to the extent that it was alleged they
acted as the agents of the hospital, making the hospital legally
responsible for their actions.314
After approximately a one-month trial, the jury found that
resuscitation had been performed on Sidney without the consent of
the Millers and that the negligence of the hospital and HCA
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. 2003).
311. Id. at 764.
312. ld.
313. See George J. Annas, Extremely Preterm Birth and Parental Authority to Refuse Treatment-The
Case of Sidney Miller, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2118,2119 (2004).
314. See Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 764; see also Annas, supra note 313, at 2119.
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"proximately caused the occurrence in question." 315 Additionally, the
jury concluded that both HCA and the hospital were grossly
negligent, that the hospital acted with malice, and that Dr. Otero was
the hospital's agent in the resuscitation of Sidney.316 The jury
awarded the Millers $29,400,000 in actual damages, $17,503,066 in
prejudgment interest, and $13,500,000 in punitive damages. 317
C. The Appeal and Opinion of the Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the jury's award.318 The
court concluded that, pursuant to state law, parents could withhold
medical treatment from a child only if the child's condition was
deemed "terminal."31 9 But in Sidney's case, the court noted, there
was no "authority allowing a parent to withhold urgently-needed life-
sustaining medical treatment from a non-terminally ill child. ' 320
Thus, according to the court, HCA and the hospital were under no
duty to follow the Millers' instruction to withhold resuscitation or to
have a policy prohibiting resuscitation of newborns like Sidney
without parental consent.321 A lone dissenting justice disagreed with
the majority and stated a court order was required to override the
Millers' decision and to determine what was in the best interests of
Sidney.32
2
Upon appeal, the Texas Supreme Court concisely narrowed its role
in the matter to "determin[ing] the respective roles that parents and
healthcare providers play in deciding whether to treat an infant who
is born alive but in distress and is so premature that, despite
advancements in neonatal intensive care, has a largely uncertain
315. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tex. 2003).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 764-65 (stating "the Natural Death Act [now the Texas Advance Directives Act] did not
'impair or supersede any legal right ... a person may have to [withhold] or [withdraw] life-sustaining
treatment in a lawful manner') (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.051); see also
Annas, supra note 309, at 2119.
320. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 765 (Tex. 2003).
321. Id; accord Annas, supra note 313, at 2119.
322. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 765; Annassupra note 313, at 2119.
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prognosis." 323 After summarizing existing law that allowed parents
the authority to make health care decisions on behalf of their
children, the court noted that such parental autonomy has its limits.
The court stated that the state punishes parents only for what amounts
to child abuse or child neglect and that "as long as parents choose
from professionally accepted treatment options the choice is rarely
reviewed in court."324 Thus, absent evidence of abuse or neglect, a
parent has the right to give or withhold consent for medical treatment
for a child.325 However, the court went on to acknowledge that there
may be times when physicians must act during which consent cannot
be obtained from a parent.326 In those circumstances, the court
explained the protocol:
A physician, who is confronted with emergent circumstances and
provides life-sustaining treatment to a minor child, is not liable
for not first obtaining consent from the parents .... [This is] an
exception to the general rule that a physician commits a battery
by providing medical treatment without consent. As such, the
exception is narrowly circumscribed and arises only in emergent
circumstances when there is no time to consult the parents or
seek court intervention .... 327
In other words, physicians will not be legally liable for erring on the
side of preservation of life in emergencies. 328 In disagreeing with the
Millers' contention that Sidney's birth was not an "emergent
circumstance" and that there was plenty of time to seek a court order,
the court concluded that the circumstances were unique, in that, a
decision about resuscitation could not reasonably be made before
birth. The court noted:
323. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 766.
324. Id. at 767 (quoting Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986)).
325. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 766-67 (Tex. 2003); see also Annas, supra note 313, at
2120.
326. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 767.
327. Id. at 767-68.
328. Id. at 767-68; see Annas, supra note 313, at 2120.
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The evidence established that Sidney could only be properly
evaluated when she was born. Any decision the Millers made
before Sidney's birth concerning her treatment at or after her
birth would necessarily be based on speculation. [A decision
made before birth] could not control whether the circumstances
facing Dr. Otero were emergent because it would not have been a
fully informed one according to the evidence in this case.
329
The court held that the actions of Dr. Otero were not negligent
because he was required to "make a split-second decision [and even
though] the Millers were both present in the delivery room, there was
simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment or to institute legal
proceedings .. ,330
Throughout the legal proceedings, HCA had consistently argued
that the federal Baby Doe rules forbade any denial of medical
treatment based on quality of life considerations. 331 The healthcare
corporation argued that the rules were "scrupulously followed" and
"faithful adherence to the public policy established by the regulations
should not be thwarted through civil liability in damages .... ,332
While the court agreed in spirit, it went on to note that the rules
required Texas to provide a mechanism by which the child protective
services system could initiate legal proceedings to prevent the
withholding of medical treatment from infants.333 But it was clear
that neither the hospital nor HCA requested child protective services
to initiate legal proceedings to override the Millers' decision to
withhold treatment.
334
The court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, declining to
impose liability for battery or negligence on a physician for providing
329. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 769.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 771.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 771 (Tex. 2003).
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life-sustaining treatment under emergent circumstances to an infant
without parental consent.
335
D. Implications of the Decision
George J. Annas, professor of law and bioethics since 1972,
correctly notes that the Texas Supreme Court's decision limits
physician discretion to the moments immediately after the birth of an
infant.336 "More troubling," writes Annas, "the court implies that life
is always preferable to death for a newborn and thus could be
interpreted in the future to support the neonatologist who always
resuscitates newborns, no matter how premature or how unlikely their
survival may be without severe disabilities."
337
The decision to resuscitate Sidney brought with it a new set of
difficult decisions. While the court made it clear that after an initial
emergency assessment by a physician at the time of delivery (with or
without parental consent), parental consent for any subsequent
medical treatment would be required.338 If refused or not provided, a
health-care facility would need to pursue a court order.
Ethically, this requires a frank discussion with the parents about
the health of and prognosis for their child, as well as trials of therapy
that have realistic stopping points. Because there is a lack of
uniformity nationwide regarding a clear approach to be used in cases
like that of Sidney Miller, individual hospital policies and guidelines
expressly delineating physician and parent roles in making reasonable
medical decisions in the best interests of the infant may be the best
we can do.
339
Approximately one year before the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in the Miller case, the United States Congress once again
sought to fervently promote a sanctity of life preference through
legislative means.
335. Id. at 772.
336. See Annas, supra note 313, at 2122-23.
337. Id. at 2121.
338. Id. at2123.
339. Id.
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VII. THE BORN-ALIVE INFANTS PROTECTION ACT OF 2002:
A BABY DOE SEQUEL?
In 2002, Congress once again enacted legislation exhibiting a
philosophical preference for the sanctity of life ethic by overriding
any meaningful parental rights in making health-care decisions on
behalf of a marginally-viable newborn, regardless of the child's long-
term viability or quality-of-life concerns. The Born-Alive Infants
Protection Act of 2002 (BAIPA),34 ° passed a Republican controlled
House and a Democrat controlled Senate with very little political
opposition, had the intent "to repudiate the flawed notion that a
child's entitlement to the protections of the law is dependent upon
whether the child's mother or others want him or her." 341 Understood
by physicians to be an anti-abortion measure, there was very little
initial concern regarding its passage; the medical community
ultimately responded that the law would not alter normative medical
practice.342 However, since its enactment, BAIPA's reach has
extended to infants born extremely premature via enforcement of
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)
regulations and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA).3 43 While the ultimate legal impact of the Act remains
largely unknown, it is clear that BAIPA avoids any reference to
medical standards of care, including the best interests of the infant,
and does not specifically protect a parent's decision-making authority
after delivery. 344 Similar to the Baby Doe rules enacted during the
Reagan Era, BAIPA continues a philosophical preference toward
vitalism and preserving the sanctity of life at all costs.
This Part of the Article discusses the history and purpose behind
BAIPA as well as the federal government's use of EMTALA
340. Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (2002).
341. H.R. REP.No. 107-186, at3 (2001).
342. See Am. Acad. of Ped. Neonatal Resuscitation Prog. Steering Comm., supra note 14, at 681.
343. See Sadath A. Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human Services and the
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal Practice, 116
PEDIATRICS e576, e576 (2005).
344. Id. at e582.
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regulations and CAPTA to enforce the Act's intent. It additionally
discusses the Act's negation of parental decision-making power on
behalf of an extremely premature or disabled newborn. Although the
medical community dismisses BAIPA as inconsequential, this
resulting oversight may ultimately lead to increased litigation
between a physician required to resuscitate a marginally-viable infant
and a parent who opposes such efforts.
A. History, Purpose, and Policy of BAIPA
The purpose of BAIPA was to establish that "infants who are born
alive, at any stage of development (and regardless of the
circumstances of their birth), are persons who are entitled to the
protections of the law."345 To some degree, BAIPA was a legislative
response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg
v. Carhart,346 overturning a state law that outlawed partial-birth
abortion.347 The Act amended Title I of the United States Code by
expanding the legal definition of "person," "human being," "child,"
or "individual," to include "every infant member of the species homo
sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development." 348 It also
defined the term "person" to include "an infant who is completely
expelled or extracted from his or her mother and who is alive,
regardless of whether or not the infant's development is believed to
be, or is in fact, sufficient to permit long-term survival, and
regardless of whether the infant survived an abortion." 349 An infant
born alive is deemed, by the terms of the Act, as one who "displays
any of several specific signs of life-breathing, a heartbeat, and/or
definite movement of voluntary muscles." 350 Thus, according to
BAIPA's statutory language, an eighteen-week miscarried fetus with
345. Am. Acad. of Ped. Neonatal Resuscitation Prog. Steering Committee, supra note 14, at 680.
346. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
347. Id. at 946; see also Sayeed, supra note 343, at e577.
348. Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (2002).
349. Am. Acad. of Ped. Neonatal Resuscitation Prog. Steering Committee, supra note 14, at 680-81.
350. Id. at681.
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a detectable heartbeat after delivery is entitled to full protection under
the law even though long-term survival is highly unlikely.
351
At the time of its passage, the few legislators who opposed the Act
noted that it "does nothing" and "does not change existing law."
352
Advocates of BAIPA as well as its congressional sponsors admitted
that the legislation would not impose a new standard of medical care
upon physicians nor change existing law. 353 However, the law
unequivocally alters the physician norm of deferring to parental
discretion regarding the initiation or discontinuation of medical
treatment for fragile newboms. In fact, the bill's stated purpose was
to repudiate the notion that parents should have decision-making
power in those circumstances.
354
After President George W. Bush signed BAIPA into law, the AAP
Neonatal Resuscitation Program (NRP) Steering Committee issued
an opinion stating that the law's reach would not affect day-to-day
neonatal medical practice and standards.
B. Response of the American Academy of Pediatrics
In March 2003, fewer than eight months after the passage of
BAIPA, the AAP NRP Steering Committee issued an opinion
regarding the law's effects on normative neonatal medical practice.355
The Committee stated that although the Act contained "a great deal
of rhetoric," the "law does not proscribe medical care for newly born
infants delivered at the limits of viability. 3 56 More specifically, the
committee noted:
The debate regarding the efficacy of providing medical care to
premature infants below a certain weight or gestational age is
351. See Sayeed, supra note 343, at e577.
352. H.R. REP. No. 107-186, at 28 (2001) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt at meeting of Committee on
the Judiciary).
353. See Sayeed, supra note 89, at 601.
354. See Sayeed, supra note 343, at e578.
355. Am. Acad. of Ped. Neonatal Resuscitation Prog. Steering Comm., supra note 14, at 680-81.
356. Id.at681.
1162 [Vol. 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1162 2008-2009
  TE I ERSITY  I  ol. :  
t ctable t t fter   itled t  ti  r 
   t gh long-ter  survival is highly unlikely. 35 I 
t     ,   i lators  sed  t 
 t  es t i " and "does not change existing law.,,352 
t s   ll  ssional rs  
  i lation l       l  
 i s   ting .  ,   
lly t rs  i ian   rring l 
ti n i   i ti   i tion   
t t   rn .   '  ted se  
 iate  ti  t t rents l   i i - aking 
r i  t se circu stances.354 
 i t        
l itation   ri g   
 i   t     t  
tal l tice  . 
    iatrics 
  , r  t   f 
      i  
   ti e l l 35  
     i ed    
,"     l    
    ility.,,356   
  
      
t r  l  
   
p. O. ,   ) t t t  . l i  tt t ti   itt   
 
 .  ,  . 
   
Pe . . 
 at 681. 
66
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/4
BABY DOE AND BEYOND
clearly not relevant in the context of this law . . . . [BAIPA]
should not in any way affect the approach that physicians
currently follow with respect to the extremely premature infant.
Physicians should discuss treatment options with parents,
preferably before the birth of the infant.
357
The Committee essentially dismissed the intent and purpose of the
law with its statements. 358 The Committee further noted the
following:
At that point decisions about withholding or discontinuing medical
treatment that is considered futile may be considered by the medical
care providers in conjunction with the parents .... Those newly born
infants who are deemed appropriate to not resuscitate or to have
medical support withdrawn should be treated with dignity and
respect, and provided with 'comfort care' measures.359
Thus, it could be said that the medical community responsible for
treating extremely premature and disabled infants on a daily basis
discounted the law as a symbolic gesture to affirm the sanctity of life,
rather than as a substantive law altering neonatal practice. However,
the AAP's remarks and conclusions may have been premature. The
Bush Administration subsequently dusted the cobwebs off BAIPA
and began actively enforcing its terms under other federal laws.
C. BAIPA Transitions from Symbolic to Substantive Law
As BAIPA lay dormant for nearly two years, very little attention
was paid to it. Then, in April 2005, the Secretary of DHHS
announced that his agency would begin enforcing regulations
impacted by the law through the EMTALA and CAPTA.360 Similar
to the Reagan Administration's policies after the passage of the Baby
Doe rules, the Bush Administration's resurrection of a dormant and
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.at681.
360. See Sayeed, supra note 343, at e576.
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symbolic law threatened to greatly influence normative neonatal
practice. The DHHS inter-agency memorandum detailing the
relationship between BAIPA and EMTALA immediately set forth the
agency's stance:
It has recently come to the agency's attention that there may be
occasions where, in hospitals, an infant may be born alive within
the meaning of the definition added to the U.S. Code by
[BAIPA], but where hospitals have failed to comply with the
requirements of EMTALA.
36 1
Under BAIPA, the DHHS interpreted EMTALA to protect all
"born-alive" infants and stated it would actively investigate
allegations of suspected violations whenever it found evidence that a
newborn was not provided with at least a medical screening
examination under circumstances in which a "prudent layperson
observer" could conclude from the infant's "appearance or behavior"
that it was "suffering from an emergency medical condition."
362
Thus, a family member could trigger an EMTALA investigation after
observing the delivery of a twenty-week fetus who maintained a
heartbeat for an hour before its death.363 When faced with such a
scenario, most neonatologists would not consider it an emergency
medical condition, but rather a medical situation requiring comfort
care to be given to the infant and support given to the family.
364
There is no flexibility under the Act's provisions for physician
discretion, however; there is also no clear guidance whether
screening examinations are required for all newborns regardless of
survivability. 3
65
361. Center for Medicaid & State Operations/Survey & Certification Group, Interaction of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of
2002, Baltimore, M.D., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Servs., Ref: S&C-05-26, Apr. 22, 2005, available at http://www.bricker.com/LegalServices/Practice/
HCare/laws/SCLetter05-26.pdf.
362. See Sayeed, supra note 343, at e576.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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In order to enforce its policies, the DHHS called on "individuals
within health care facilities" to notify authorities when they suspected
physicians were exceeding their authority by withholding medical
treatment from newborns. 366 But its real import may be the agency's
insistence on local execution of legal remedies to prevent
nontreatment decisions deemed impermissible by the Baby Doe rules.
The federal CAPTA rules "arguably remove quality-of-life
considerations from the decision-making calculus and therefore may
conflict with the best interests paradigm advocated by the American
Academy of Pediatrics."
367
D. Possible Long-Term Impact of BAIPA
There is no question that BAIPA avoids any reference to the Best
Interests Standard and actively dismisses parental involvement in
decision-making after delivery. 368 The reading of the law to require
screening or resuscitation of a known nonviable born-alive infant
clearly leads to absurd results; it also leads to potential disastrous
long-term consequences if a marginally-viable infant is "saved"
through medical intervention against the parent's wishes and the
child is so severely mentally and physically disabled as to have a
nonexistent quality of life, profoundly impacting the family's
financial, emotional, and psychological well-being. Sidney Miller is a
prime example of what can happen. Given that the expressed
legislative intent of BAIPA was to ensure treatment is provided to
infants clearly born before viability, judges will have to interpret the
law accordingly, no matter how impractical the result.369 If, however,
BAIPA ends up being read as only guaranteeing that all unfortunate,
pre-viable newborns are treated "humanely," and given appropriate
palliative care, its efforts should be applauded. 37
366. Id.
367. See Sayeed, supra note 343, at e576.
368. Id.
369. Id. at e582.
370. Id. at e584.
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With President Obama at the helm of the United States, it is
unlikely that the terms of BAIPA will be actively enforced at least for
the next four years. A more prudent measure would be to urge a
Democratically-led Congress to repeal the Act so little question
remains regarding the proper method of decision making for
marginally-viable infants: physician assessment of the infant's
physical condition, conveying accurate diagnostic and prognostic
information to parents, and active parental involvement in making a
medical decision in the best interests of the infant.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
In 1990, the editors of the Harvard Law Review published a
comprehensive ethical and legal analysis on the matter of neonatal
treatment decisions along with specific proposals on how to improve
past policy mistakes. 371 The article's opening comments succinctly
capture the locus of the debate:
Treatment decisions for severely handicapped and premature
newborns are among the most disturbing and divisive of the legal
and ethical dilemmas posed by increasingly sophisticated
medical technologies. Because the paradigm of the rational,
autonomous patient cannot apply to the newborn infant, the
American legal tradition provides no definitive guidance on the
issues of whether and when to withhold medical treatment. The
birth of a severely handicapped or premature child thus forces
society to choose between competing visions of what gives
human life value and to determine the role of modern medical
technology in that vision. Currently, decisions to withhold
treatment from severely handicapped and premature infants are
controlled by federal law; however, the federal standard has
proved inadequate to address the complex issues surrounding
371. Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., Medical Technology and the Law. IV. Neonatal Treatment Decisions, in
Developments in the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1584 (1990).
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such decisions. The controversy demands a more effective
resolution.3
72
The editors' assessments of the practical and philosophical
influences affecting normative neonatal practice were correct back
then and they remain correct today. This Part of the Article offers
practical and policy recommendations to reduce or remove medical
decision-making conflict in the NICU on behalf of a marginally-
viable newborn.
A. The Need for Parental Autonomy and Physician Discretion
Neonatologists and other physicians recognize that a NICU is a
foreign world to most people.373 Though they spend their careers in
the awe-inspiring unit, it is often a novel and jarring experience for
parents-where hopes of health and happiness can be threatened by
the birth of an extremely premature or disabled infant facing death.
374
Parents often feel victimized, shocked, angry, and guilty.375 Thus,
neonatologists should anticipate the vulnerability of parents,
collaborate with them, and guide them through an often very difficult
decision. 376 The practical realities of the NICU require that parents
and physicians be provided with some latitude in making medical
determinations on behalf of a marginally-viable infant. However,
with the current federal regulations in place, such discretion is
significantly thwarted. A modified federal legislative posture
allowing for such discretion would greatly enhance parent and
physician ability to make medical determinations in the best interests
of an imperiled newborn.
372. Id. at 1584.
373. Morrow, supra note 264, at 1147.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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B. Procedural Safeguards
It is understood that parental ability to make such awesome life or
death determinations may often be compromised by the stress, grief,
and fear of making the wrong decision-whether it be death for a
child or a severely handicapped life. Parents must live with the
decision to let a child go or use emotional, financial, and other
resources to sustain the child's poor quality of life. Under these
conditions, parents may lack the rational ability to act in the child's
bests interests.
1. Effective Counseling
Neonatologists can provide parents with few guarantees regarding
the future of a marginally-viable newborn. They can treat the
newborn to the highest medical standards and use the latest in
technology. Parents, on the other hand, have the agonizing role of
watching helplessly at the infant's bedside. Thus, when physicians
determine a medical course of action for an infant, it is best to
actively include parents; when parents are excluded from the decision
making process, their sense of helplessness may be increased.377
A 2005 study of the interaction between neonatologists and parents
regarding infant intensive care found parents were reluctant to be
actively involved in treatment decisions because they did not
understand the complex medical information they received and were
often fully unaware of the long-term implications of their
decisions. 378 The study found that most parents were young,
bewildered, and had never before contemplated the possibility of
what would be in their child's best interests--especially if serious
complications occurred.37 9 Thus, a growing number of medical
professionals are strongly encouraging the formulation of medical
377. See id. at 1147.
378. Joy H. Penticuff & Kristopher L. Arheart, Effectiveness of an Intervention to Improve Parent-
Professional Collaboration in Neonatal Intensive Care, 19 J. PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING 187,
188 (2005).
379. Id.
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staff guidelines to effectively counsel parents regarding the medical
facts of the infant's case, treatment options, and supportive care to
help them cope with difficult decisions.
380
Before an infant's birth, the AAP and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists recommend, at the very least, that
pregnant women and their families be provided with an overview of
the potential complications of extreme prematurity and should be
informed of the range of survival and possibility of long-term
neurodevelopmental disabilities. 381 For those with unexpected
extremely premature births, parents and families should be treated
with dignity and respect and supportively informed of the infant's full
medical picture. If the situation warrants, physicians and medical
staff should inform parents that palliative care may be the best course
of action for a child. "When a decision is made to withhold
resuscitation ... or forgo other life-supporting treatments, the family
should be treated with compassion, focusing on their needs." 382 When
death is inevitable, hospital staff should allow time for parents to
hold, touch, and interact with the infant before and after the infant
dies; simple acts such as naming the child or obtaining a photograph,
crib card, name band, or footprint sheet may give special meaning to
the parents and should be offered.383 Clergy, supportive family, and
counseling groups should similarly be made available to grieving
parents and assessment of their emotional and psychological well-
being should be conducted.384
Parental and medical discretion, however, should b limited to
cases in which the value of treatment is truly unclear. Medical
judgment should not demand continued treatment when there is no
therapeutic benefit and when the infant's parents oppose such efforts.
380. See Kaempf et al., supra note 14, at 22; MacDonald et al., supra note 14, at 1024; Robin L.
Pierucci et al., End-of-Life Care for Neonates and Infants: The Experience and Effects of a Palliative
Care Consultation Service, 108 PEDIATRICS 653, 653 (2001).
381. See Kaempf et al., supra note 14, at 27; Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
Perinatal Care at the Threshold of Viability, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 617, 618 (2002).
382. See MacDonald et al., supra note 14, at 1026.
383. Id.
384. Id.
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Similarly, physicians and health-care staff who are requested by a
vitalist parent to continue a non-therapeutic course of treatment
should be heard and afforded adequate due process protection.
2. Hospital Ethics Committees
Nearly all hospitals have an ethics committee or other panel to
resolve difficult medical issues, such as the withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment for a marginally-viable infant.
Typically, such committees are comprised of physicians, social
workers, nurses, administrators, clergy, and even laypersons. 385 As
demonstrated by the cases of Sun Hudson and Emilio Gonzales, a
hospital's ethics committee will examine the complete medical
picture of the infant, opinions of the treating physicians, and those of
the parents and family. The committee will offer recommendations
and advice based upon the facts presented and may alternatively
recommend other non-judicial mechanisms to provide an acceptable
form of resolution for all parties.
3. Mediation Alternatives
The need for mediation may arise when a hospital ethics
committee is unable to provide agreeable resolution to a particular
conflict. The American Medical Association (AMA) and the AAP
386advocate mediation when disagreements arise. Because mediation
is a non-judicial form of conflict resolution, it often employs therapy
and morality to determine a just decision. The process is designed to
overcome misunderstandings arising out of miscommunication and
possibly quench escalating hostility between the parties allowing
them to effectively communicate during an emotionally charged time.
Parties must be willing to talk to one another, however, to reach an
acceptable consensus. In some instances, that may be an
impossibility. When the parties are unable or unwilling to agree, state
385. See Joanna M. Canter, Nonjudicial Alternatives for Resolving End-of-Life Decisions for Minors,
43 FAM. CT. REv. 527, 533 (2005).
386. Id. at 534.
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law or judicial intervention may be necessary as a means of last
resort.
C. Statutory Mechanisms
Used in the cases of Sun Hudson and Emilio Gonzales, the Texas
Advance Directives Act387 provides a process-based mechanism to
allow a hospital ethics committee to review cases when a physician
refuses to honor a parent's demand that continued medical treatment
be provided to an ailing newborn.388 The statute provides that if a
committee agrees that continued life-sustaining treatment is
inappropriate, "[t]he physician and health care facility are not
obligated to provide life-sustaining treatment after the 10th day."
389
Other provisions of the Act require the health-care facility to assist
the parent in locating an alternative facility willing to accept the
child.39° Judicial intervention in such cases is limited to granting an
extension of the ten-day waiting period if a court finds, "by a
preponderance of the evidence, that there is a reasonable expectation
that a physician or health-care facility that will honor the patient's
directive will be found if the time extension is granted.",
391
Although the benefits and drawbacks of the state law have been
discussed in length by legal scholars elsewhere, 392 the concept of
such a mechanism is an attractive alternative to outright judicial
decision-making to resolve conflict. Fashioning such a statute should
be done with great care to ensure a proper balance between parental
autonomy to make medical treatment decisions on behalf of a
marginally-viable infant, physician discretion to determine that a
387. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166 et seq. (Vernon 2007). In sum, the Act's statutory
provisions set forth guidelines to be followed when a physician refuses to honor a treatment decision
made by or on behalf of a patient and provides for transfer of the patient to another facility willing to
accept him or her within a specified time.
388. Id. § 166.046.
389. Id. § (e).
390. Id. § 166.046(d).
391. Id. § 166.046(g).
392. See, e.g., Dahm, supra note 83; O'Callaghan, supra note 83; Zerwas, supra note 83; Halevy &
McGuire, supra note 133; Lightfoot, supra note 120; Rumbaugh, supra note 278.
20091
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1171 2008-2009
] Y   D 1171 
 l ti n   ssary f t 
 
   
   ,  
  ce87  - ased   
 itt    i i  
 t's  i  l t t 
i  388   i    
itt  s t  i i  t t  
ri te, ] e i    t 
t   lif - t i i g treat ent after the 10th day.,,389 
   - re  
t    t  
3 o  ti      
i     t  
r ce   t tion 
 i      tient's 
  f  if the ti e extension is granted.,,391 
 it     
 ere,392  f 
    
   
    
     
l  i   
. x     . I r  
    i i  
   
   
!d.   
.   
  l66.0 ( }  
.   
 , ,    , ra   
 ra ra  
75
Conway: Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical In
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
particular course of medical treatment is inappropriate, and an
effective procedure to resolve the conflict between the two in an
appropriate timeframe.
D. Judicial Intervention
Severely disabled and extremely premature infants have due
process rights to adequate procedural protection in any decision to
compel or withhold medical treatment based on state law.393
Accordingly, judicial review may be the avenue to resolve treatment
disputes. However, when the judicial system intervenes, family
privacy is undermined and a private matter is immediately thrust into
the public domain for discussion via media outlets. The court system
is largely unfamiliar with the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the infant's medical case and may ultimately make a
decision that is not in the best interests of the child. Much legal
scholarship has been devoted to exposing the inadequacies of the
judicial system as a forum for resolving disputes regarding medical
treatment.394 The AAP argues that such judicial intervention is only
warranted as a last resort:
Recourse to the courts should be reserved for occasions when
adjudication is clearly required by law or when concerned parties
have disagreements that they cannot resolve, despite appropriate
consultation, concerning matters of substantial importance.
395
To best safeguard against the possibility of utilizing the judicial
system to resolve medical treatment disputes, health-care facilities
should develop policies and guidelines ensuring that effective
counseling, care, and comfort are provided to parents in an effort to
393. See Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 371, at 1611.
394. See generally O'Callaghan, supra note 83; Martin L. Smith et al., Texas Hospitals' Experience
with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 35 CRrICAL CARE MED., 1271 (2007); Canter, supra note 385.
395. See Canter, supra note 385, at 533.
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BABY DOE AND BEYOND
maximize collaboration with treating physicians when making
difficult medical treatment decisions in the best interests of the infant.
CONCLUSION: CONSISTENT ASSESSMENT, CONTROL,
COLLABORATION, COUNSELING, CARE, AND COMFORT
Given the deep moral and emotional turmoil impacting medical
decision making on behalf of extremely premature infants grasping
onto the edge of viability, it is clear that neonatologists and
physicians in the NICU trenches daily largely dismiss a rigid federal
policy in favor of parental collaboration when determining what is in
the newborn's best interests. However, the Baby Doe debate rages
on, looming like a dark cloud over many health-care facilities. True
consensus is lacking among medical professionals nationwide
regarding how best to deal with philosophical federal legislative
initiatives favoring the sanctity of life over all other values.
Legislating that human life is sacred and is to be preserved at all costs
ignores a more complex set of philosophical, financial, and emotional
concerns of the average parent when thinking about the future quality
of life of his or her severely disabled child or for the physician
treating a struggling newborn who only experiences pain.
Medical decision making for the marginally-viable infant will
always be problematic for all parties involved. Complicating matters
further are the impersonal, public federal policies being forced into
an extremely private matter between parents and physician. The
neonatal medical team should strive for accurate and dependable
medical facts, and the parents should demand full and clear
communication regarding those details. Physicians must continually
assess the infant to provide the most complete and up-to-date medical
picture to the parents and counsel them accordingly. Granted proper
decision making authority, the parents, in collaboration with the
physician's medical expertise and knowledge, must work together in
evaluating the latest developments and complications of the infant's
medical condition when making life or death determinations. It is
proper to grant the parents some leeway in making these decisions.
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However, there may come a point when, in the case of a parent's
adamant vitalist belief, the physician's medical and ethical
responsibility to the newborn may override parental demands. In such
a case, health-care facilities must have policies and guidelines that
adequately ensure a parent is heard-but also ensure medical
treatment decisions are ultimately made in the best interests of the
infant. Non-judicial intervention in most instances may be the best
means of resolving the conflict.
Parents share their lives with their children. They interact, live, and
learn from each other. The agonizing life or death choice a parent
makes for his or her extremely premature infant in the small meeting
room outside of the NICU not only dramatically impacts the infant's
future quality of life, but the lives of the parents and family as well. It
is not the legislator or the physician that must ultimately financially,
emotionally, and physically care for a severely disabled infant with
no hopes for real human interaction or relationships-it is the
parents' responsibility. A federal or state policy dismissive of
parental rights, instead favoring the sanctity of life in all
circumstances, ignores this important fact. Philosopher Peter Singer
eloquently and correctly stated the following:
If we put aside the obsolete and erroneous notion of the sanctity
all human life, we may start to look at human life as it really is:
at the equality of life that each human being has or can achieve.
Then it will be possible to approach these difficult questions of
life and death with the ethical sensitivity that each case
demands."
396
The parents know their child's life is sacred, but they are also
aware that the infant's likelihood (or lack thereof) of having
meaningful relationships with others, experiencing joy and love,
acquiring knowledge, and interacting with the world, is important to
396. Peter Singer, The Quality of Life Is Most Important, in TERMINATING LIFE: CONFLICTING
VALUES IN HEALTH CARE 92, 95 (Gary E. McCuen & Therese Boucher eds., 1985).
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human existence. Physicians must not forget this, nor should
legislators.
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